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According to the World Development Report 2008, if the world is committed to 
reducing poverty and achieving sustainable growth, it would unleash the powers of 
agriculture because the majority of the world’s poor depend on agriculture for their 
livelihood. The financial sector can play an important role in supporting agriculture 
through the extension of agricultural credit. Literature shows that this can only be 
successfully achieved when financial institutions operate under stable macroeconomic 
conditions. This study explores the experience of givin  agricultural credit under 
volatile macroeconomic conditions. It focuses on a case study of Zimbabwe, whose 
hyperinflationary levels reached over 3 000% in 2007 and a monthly rate of 79,6 
billion percent in mid-November 2008. Findings from interviews with informants 
from stakeholder institutions in the agricultural sector revealed that the problem of 
agricultural credit in Zimbabwe was not only due to hyperinflation but also due to 
poor institutional capacity and dual agricultural policies. Some of these problems 
existed before hyperinflation. The paper argues that the future of agricultural credit in 
Zimbabwe is anchored on three pillars. The first is a stable macroeconomic 
environment. This involves bringing down hyperinflation, establishing land tenure 
security and other rights and improving rural infrast ucture. The second is 
development of financial institutions and systems (building institutional capacity, 
building a culture of loan repayment and capitalisation through private partnership). 
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1.1 The Problem 
This study explores the perspectives of Zimbabwean stakeholders regarding 
agricultural credit under volatile macroeconomic conditions. In the 1980s, Zimbabwe 
was considered the breadbasket of Southern Africa but the economic decline that 
Zimbabwe has experienced since 1997 has led to high unemployment and an increase 
in poverty. It had negative growth (Gross Domestic Product) and agriculture, the 
backbone of the country’s economy performed well beow its capacity since the 
introduction of the Fast Tract Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) in 2000. In 
February 2007, inflation reached hyperinflationary levels of approximately 1 000% 
according to the official rate but unofficial estimates put it at 3 000% (Doré et al. 
2008). In mid-November 2008 hyperinflation was estimated to be at a monthly rate of 
79,6 billion percent, making Zimbabwe the first country in the 21st Century to have 
such an inflation record and second to Hungary in the list of the highest inflation 
records in the world’s history (Hanke and Kwok 2009). Given that agricultural credit 
is important in supporting agricultural activities in the country, this research explores 
how it was extended under such volatile macroeconomic conditions and reviews the 
main challenges that were experienced. The views of key stakeholders in the 
agricultural sector, namely, institutions that supplied credit and representative bodies 
of various groups of farmers, were sought and interpreted in light of literature 
regarding agricultural credit and hyperinflation.  
1.2 Central Argument 
International experience and research shows that a stable macroeconomic 
environment and the development of financial institutions are critical conditions in 
providing result-orientated agricultural credit in developing countries. A stable 
macroeconomic environment enjoys, amongst others, low inflation, property rights, 
enforceable credit rights that enable lending institutions to recover their money and 
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suitable conditions for investing in rural finance. Based on this international 
experience and field findings, three main arguments are advanced in this research. 
First, this paper argues that the volatile macroeconomic conditions in Zimbabwe, 
which were characterised by hyperinflation, a crash in domestic demand, lack of land 
tenure security and poor rural infrastructure, were not favourable for extending credit. 
It is these obstacles that have to be addressed before addressing the issue of 
agricultural credit. The fast erosion of the value of the loans due to hyperinflation led 
farmers to scale-down their operations while the fix d interest rate of the loans meant 
that the credit was easy to repay since it lost value due to hyperinflation.  The 
consequence was that lending institutions did not recover their costs and their asset 
base was eroded. The lack of land tenure security, due to the Government-led farm 
invasions, led private commercial banks to withdraw their financial services to rural 
areas. This latter point is an issue of the macroeconomic as well as macro/micro 
political environment that this paper considers as in urgent need of attention. 
Second, while addressing these challenges may improve the macroeconomic 
environment, the development of public and private financial institutions is necessary 
to increase their viability as well as outreach to smallholder farmers in Zimbabwe. 
Findings showed that there were delays in the dispatching of subsidised government 
loans and reluctance from private commercial banks in advancing loans to 
smallholder farmers during the period under study. However, literature shows that 
such a problem existed even before hyperinflation. These kinds of challenges, it is 
argued, can be overcome through capacity building or institutional innovation of both 
private and public financial institutions and agenci s that support agriculture.  
Third, both improvement of the macroeconomic environment and the development of 
public and private financial institutions may not be possible if leaders in Zimbabwe 
do not demonstrate enough political will. This political will needs to prioritise 
agricultural development through the formulation of appropriate policies and a 
commitment to their full implementation.   
In short, based on literature and field findings, this paper argues that the future of 
agricultural credit in the country depends on a stable macroeconomic environment, 
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development of financial institutions and systems and the determination of the 
country’s leaders to formulate and implement policies that benefit the citizenry.   
1.3 Relevance of the study 
The Chinese word for ‘crisis’, represents both danger and opportunity. Applying this 
interpretation and accepting that the Zimbabwean crisis is not going to be the last one 
in the world, this study draws lessons for future use in the country and elsewhere, 
most notably in developing economies. In adopting the Chinese understanding of 
crisis, this study tries to identify both the challenges and opportunities that the 
Zimbabwean crisis presents in relation to development through agriculture. Zimbabwe 
can also take this opportunity to finally resolve th  credit problems that were present 
even before the current volatile conditions.    
In addition, the research feeds into the broader debate of poverty reduction and food 
security whereby agriculture is perceived to be the key instrument. This is especially 
relevant in developing economies like those in the Africa Sub-Saharan region where 
approximately 70% of the poor live in rural areas and depend on agriculture for their 
livelihoods (World Bank 2000). According to the 2008 World Development Report, if 
the world is committed to reducing poverty and achieving sustainable growth, the 
powers of agriculture should be unleashed because the majority of the world’s poor 
depend on agriculture for their survival. There arelr ady several success stories of 
agriculture contributing to poverty reduction and economic growth in the developing 
world.  In countries such as Kenya, Chile and China, agriculture has also created good 
business opportunities such as high-value products for domestic markets and 
international markets (World Bank 2007). The revival of agricultural development in 
Zimbabwe, a country whose economy is largely agrarian, s important in ensuring 
economic growth and purging poverty.  
The questions raised in this study intertwine with an already existing international 
debate regarding how agricultural development can be best achieved in terms of 
agricultural policies and financing systems in any given developing country or region. 
Debate exists of whether or not developing countries should prioritise either 
smallholder farming or large-scale commercial farming in order to maximise 
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productivity and ensure poverty reduction. There ar ntagonizing views regarding 
which of these two agricultural policy approaches dveloping countries should follow 
(Lipton 2005; Agriculture and Natural Resources Team nd Thomson 2004). The 
question of how a particular agricultural policy should be funded is also relevant in 
the circles of agricultural development as it triggers the discussion regarding the types 
of institutions that should finance this high risk sector and how supplied credit should 
be recovered. By raising questions on the role of public and private financial 
institutions in lending credit, this study contributes to the debate of state-versus-
market forces, such as interventionist and neoliberal policies, within the context of the 
structural approaches to development. 
1.4 Structure of the Research 
This work is divided into seven chapters. Chapter Two is the literature review and is 
divided into four parts. The first part highlights he importance of agriculture in 
development and poverty reduction. The second and thir  parts deal with subsidised 
credit and the development of financial institutions respectively, the two concepts 
derived from international experience regarding agricultural credit. The last part gives 
the definition, characteristics and cures of hyperinflation and then discusses the 
challenges and experiences regarding extending credit in hyperinflationary conditions.  
Chapter Three outlines the methodology used in this study. It gives the rationale 
behind the use of a qualitative approach and a casestudy methodology in this 
research. This chapter also describes the sampling methods and the challenges 
encountered in the field. How the data was collected and analysed is also explained 
here. The last part picks out the issues arising from the study’s limitations. 
The fourth chapter presents the background of agricultural credit in Zimbabwe as well 
as the context in which the fieldwork took place. The background is divided into three 
main macroeconomic eras: the colonial era, the control regime (1980-1990) and the 
liberalization (1991-1996) eras. The context is characterised by a deepening 
macroeconomic crisis (1997-2008). This part describes the features of the volatile 
macroeconomic conditions and considers hyperinflation as the main dominating facet 
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of the economic crisis. It also presents the debate regarding agricultural activities 
during this period. 
Chapter Five presents the findings and it spells out the perspectives of stakeholders in 
agriculture. It is divided into two main parts. Part one describes the profiles of the 
institutions from which the respondents were drawn. The second part discusses the 
emerging issues. Some issues that came up had to do with hyperinflation while others 
were related to credit in general and reflected problems that were carried over from 
the previous eras of the country’s agricultural history.  
The findings are analysed in Chapter Six. Specifically, the chapter discusses the future 
of agricultural credit in Zimbabwe as it interprets the findings in the light of the 
literature review. The last chapter summarises the issues covered in the study and 
concludes by making policy and further study recommendations.  
  




2 Agricultural Credit and Extending Credit under 
Hyperinflationary Conditions - Literature Review 
This chapter explores the international experience regarding agricultural credit and 
then, drawing from experiences in other countries, further discusses what it might 
mean to extend credit under a hyperinflationary enviro ment. Since this research is 
carried out in the field of development studies, the c apter begins by establishing the 
link between agriculture and development. 
2.1 Agriculture as a Tool for Development and Poverty Reduction 
Research has shown that an increase in agricultural productivity contributes to 
development (World Bank 2007; Lipton 2005; Haggblade 2007; Agriculture and 
Natural Resources Team and Thomson 2004). How this can be attained also depends 
on the system of agriculture in place and whether te is enough political desire to 
drive the process. 
2.1.1 The link between agriculture and development 
In developing economies that are largely agrarian and where the majority relies on 
agriculture for its livelihood, an increase in agricultural productivity is instrumental 
for economic growth and poverty reduction in general (World Bank 2007; Lipton 
2005; Haggblade 2007). Agricultural development was the platform on which the 
industrial revolution occurred in eighteen century England and Europe. In the recently 
successful economies of China, India and Vietnam, agricultural development 
preceded the rise of industries (World Bank 2007) or structural transformation. 
Structural transformation is a process whereby agricultural resources of labour and 
capital are transferred to other sectors of the economy without reducing farm output 
and increasing food prices (Haggblade 2007).  
Countries such as China, India and Ghana that have, through various ways, invested 
in agriculture, have managed to reduce poverty among their populations. It is 
estimated that growth due to agriculture in China has managed to reduce poverty by 
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3.5 times more than growth from other sectors of its economy (World Bank 2007). 
China heavily invested in agricultural research, complemented by rural investments. 
All this led to an increase in agricultural productivity that led to a high reduction level 
of rural poverty in the country (Haggblade 2007).  The recent success of poverty 
reduction in Ghana is also largely attributed to the rural households’ participation in 
increasing agricultural productivity (World Bank 2007).  
Increased agricultural productivity reduces poverty through various factors. Since 
most of the poor live in the rural areas and rely on agriculture for their living, 
improved agricultural performance has a direct and relatively immediate impact on 
the income of the rural poor while also creating on-farm employment.  Increased 
agricultural production makes food cheaper for both urban and rural poor, given that 
the population of people does not increase at a higher rate than the food supply. 
Improved performance in agriculture leads to growth and provides opportunities for 
business in the non-farm sector. While the economy gradually moves from being 
agrarian to an industrial one, it serves to stimulate structural transformation 
(Agriculture and Natural Resources Team and Thomson 2004). 
Although agriculture is an important instrument foreconomic growth and poverty 
reduction, its potential is yet to be realised in Sub-Saharan Africa where 70% of the 
poor rely on agriculture for their livelihood. This  mainly due to the following 
setback factors: too slow of a growth in agricultural productivity to make a 
meaningful reduction in poverty; unfavourable macroe onomic conditions, strict price 
and trade policies; urban bias leading to poor investm nt in agriculture; and a decline 
in official development assistance to the agricultural sector (World Bank 2007). 
2.1.2 Key ingredients for agricultural development 
There is a general assumption that key ingredients for agricultural development 
includes farm technology (improved seed, fertiliser, r search funding and extension 
services), functional markets (property rights, property standards and enforceable 
contracts), good infrastructure (farm-to-farm market roads, power lines ports, 
irrigation facilities) and institutions (Haggblade 2007). A good mixture of these 
ingredients, or rather, a good agricultural system hat specifies who does what, with 
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what, is viewed as leading to development. This question was less controversial 
during the interventionist era of the 1960s and early 1980s as it was generally agreed 
that public development institutions were best placed to provide these services. The 
experience of Asia's green revolution tended to prop up this view but Africa’s poor 
results again weakened this perspective.  Neolibera polices liberalised the agricultural 
sector, replacing the state’s role with that of the market. However, this model did not 
prove successful either. The market failed to provide the key ingredients for 
agricultural development and this was, again, most evident in Africa. Given the recent 
changes of the open world market, the debate tends to focus on whether it is 
investment in smallholder farmers or large scale farmers that will make a strong 
impact on poverty reduction and economic growth (Agriculture and Natural 
Resources Team and Thomson 2004).  
2.1.3 Large or smallholder farming system? 
The pro-large farmer protagonists argue that recent global changes (e.g. non-
sustainability of subsidies and agricultural resources, high technology required by 
economies of scale and continued urban bias) make it unrealistic to continue holding 
on to the conventional wisdom that expects smallholder farms to take the lead in 
reducing rural poverty (Maxwell 2004). However, sympathisers for smallholder 
farming argue that even though smallholder farmers, specially in Africa, may find it 
difficult to market their food produce globally, their domestic and regional markets 
are still worthwhile. For them, the phenomenon of rural poor diversifying their 
livelihoods by engaging in off-farm activities is largely due to the improved 
performance of the agricultural sector (Deininger and Binswanger 1999; Agriculture 
and Natural Resources Team and Thomson 2004). In terms of policy, this approach 
puts emphasis, not on whether smallholders succeed or not, but on how they should 
be made to succeed by reinforcing direct investment in agriculture and rural 
development and establishing institutions that would support smallholder farming.  
2.1.4 The need for political will 
International experience shows that without enough political will, a system or policy 
does not yield any positive results (Anseeuw 2010, cited in Padayachee 2010 
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[forthcoming]; Adesina 2007; Sender and Smith 1986). The successes in Asia came as 
a result of strong political resolve by various Asian governments (both democratic and 
autocratic ones) to revive their respective agricultura  sectors. India, for instance, 
sternly resolved to attain food self-sufficiency after the United States government 
decided to use food aid as a tool of foreign policy (World Bank 2007). Some authors 
have described the Asian model as one that was state-driven and market-mediated and 
that had a sharp focus on smallholder farmers. In addition, it also provided room for 
the private sector to operate profitably (Djurfeldt and Jirstrom 2005).   
According to Anseeuw’s narration of the agricultural development policies of Kenya 
and Senegal, which epitomises the experiences of most countries in the Sub-Saharan 
Africa, many countries in the region have failed due to shortcomings in the creation 
and implementation of appropriate agricultural policies (Anseeuw, 2010 in 
Padayachee 2010 [forthcoming]). However, the respective policies that Kenya and 
Senegal have since established seems to suggest that ate or public sector should play 
an important role in the economy (e.g. targeting disa vantaged smallholder farmers in 
marginalised areas) without hindering the roles of other private sector stakeholders.    
According to Adesina (2007), there is poor formulation and implementation of 
agricultural policies in African countries because farmers are not organised into 
powerful groups that demand commitment to agricultura  development from their 
political leaders. As a solution, the author suggests that the political cost of inaction 
on agriculture should be raised in order to change the political economy of agrarian 
reforms in Africa. According to Sender and Smith (1986, 133), this can be achieved 
through an organised working class, which, unfortuna ely has often been muffled by 
many post-Independence African governments in the guise of ‘unity’ or ‘African 
socialism’.  
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development’s (NEPAD) initiative brought African 
leaders together as they sought ways of reducing poverty and agreed that revitalizing 
agricultural development in the region was the way forward. As a follow-up, in 2005, 
the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP) of 
NEPAD called for a political commitment to ensure a 6% growth rate in agriculture 
(CAADP 2005, cited in Haggblade 2007).  
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2.2 Cheap Agricultural Credit to boost production 
From the 1950s until the 1980s, there was a general consensus among finance policy 
makers that subsidised credit introduced through government intervention would 
bring about economic growth and distribution of income more equitably among the 
populations (Buttari 1995) in developing countries. This was also the period when 
most development policies were largely influenced by Keynesianism. Policy makers 
on agricultural finance adopted interventionist approaches to agricultural credit. 
Government intervention with cheap credit, which aimed at achieving economic 
efficiency, was justified on the grounds that private financial markets had failed, not 
only to fund the modernization of agriculture, but also failed to extend credit to poor 
people as they favoured the rich (Buttari 1995).  The private or commercial lending 
institutions that existed tended to focus on large-scale farmers and ignored 
smallholder farmers as it was costly to process and manage unsecured small loans 
(Yaron 1992). It was then believed that the governme t could intervene to resolve the 
perceived market failure.  
This phenomenon of promoting cheap credit to support ag icultural and other real 
sector activities in the Third World has often been r ferred to as ‘financial repression’ 
Burkett (1987).   Financial repression happens when states make laws that prevent the 
financial institutions from functioning at their full capacity. Such policies may include 
capital controls, credit ceilings, interest rate ceilings, high bank reserve requirements 
as well as government ownership of banks. According to Bond (1998), such policies 
were usually made by nations prejudiced by the dictates of national productive capital 
or that were influenced electorally by populist sentiments. He argues that in the 
colonial Rhodesia, financial repression led to overaccumulation of capital by the 
white minority, cementing the structures of an uneven economy. The Agricultural 
Finance Corporation (AFC) of Rhodesia for instance, mainly served to usher cheap 
credit to white farmers, a minority group. However, ven though it is generally argued 
that financial repression interferes with efficient fi ancial intermediation by reducing 
people’s incentives to hold financial assets, economies such as Chile, Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan, and China (Zahid 1995) have rapidly grew despite financial 
repression being fairly common in these countries. The justification of supply of 
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cheap credit was based on certain policy assumptions and it called for the creation of 
tools to implement this policy.  
2.2.1 Policy assumptions 
The subsidised or targeted credit approach was mainly based on the assumption that 
farmers needed cheap credit to stimulate them to produce the much needed national 
agricultural products through increased farm output (Klein et. al. 1999). Another main 
assumption was that smallholder farmers needed credit b cause they were too poor to 
save and that those who acquired additional income spent it on consumption or 
ceremonial sprees (Adams 1978) and had no interest in deposit facilities. Since they 
were perceived as incapable of using money profitably, it was assumed that poor 
farmers would need strict monitoring when given loans (Gonzalez-Vega 1993). 
2.2.2 Policy implementation tools and challenges 
The subsidised agricultural credit system was impleented by creating various 
structures such as the state-owned agricultural development banks and the use of low 
interest rates. The policy faced various challenges that led to poor implementation.  
Since agriculture was already a risky sector for any financial intermediary to venture 
into, the specialization factor produced more negative han positive results. This 
further reduced opportunities for the development banks as potential non-farm 
customers, some of whom needed credit for income-gen rating activities, were 
excluded. It also meant that the banks’ cash flows would be determined by seasons 
and these could at times be unreliable when it came to the repayment of the loans. 
High cash flow would only take place at the beginning of the rain season, when 
farmers needed credit (Seibel 2000).  
The banks had little cash flow since deposit mobilization was not their priority and 
this reduced their chances of becoming financially viable. Efficiency for them 
included the quick release of volumes of loans, less scrutiny of repayment capacity 
and collateral, as well as the subsidizing of credit (Bourne and Graham 1984; 
Gonzalez-Vega and Graham 1995). Loan repayment and deposit mobilization were 
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not part of the mandate of these institutions, given the traditional assumption that rural 
people had neither the capacity nor will to save (Adams 1978).  
Due to low interest rates, most of these banks could neither cover average operating 
costs nor protect the purchasing power of the borrowe s’ loan portfolio (Bourne and 
Graham 1984). To mitigate this, some of these banks tended to reduce the high cost of 
serving large numbers of small loans of smallholder farmers only (Seibel 2000). In 
addition, non-priority influential clientele lobbied and took advantage of the cheap 
loans and the intended beneficiaries lost out. In this way, cheap credit yielded 
unintended negative outcomes: the opposite of income redistribution.  
Agricultural development banks were also vulnerable to political interference. 
Patronage found its way in as politicians gave loans to their supporters in the guise of 
‘helping the poor’ or ‘promoting development’ (Buttari 1995).  
In the long run, the policy of cheap agricultural credit could not remain financially 
viable since its institutions had to continuously depend on grants from governments or 
donors. As a result, most of them eventually became insolvent, required additional 
capitalizations and constantly changed names and managers in a bid to remain in 
business.  Apart from the few success stories in the now-developed economies such as 
Taiwan, government-sponsored agricultural lending institutions in many developing 
countries have often experienced failure (World Bank, 2007). Francophone West 
Africa’s state-owned agricultural banks, all of whic  operated on a supply-led basis, 
faced closure due to lack of external funding and iternal deposit mobilization. 
Anglophone West African countries such as Ghana and The Gambia were no better 
but at least demonstrated some innovation by diversifying their portfolios. 
Unfortunately however, political interference, rent-seeking and loan repayment 
default thwarted their viability (Gonzalez-Vega and Graham 1995).  
In critiquing this policy, Yaron and Charitonenko pointed out that the cheap 
agricultural credit approach was designed to treat the symptoms instead of the causes 
or the lack of access to rural finance. It simply tried to intervene and supply those 
missing financial services without addressing the reasons why there was a problem in 
the first place. Some of the root causes included high transaction costs, asymmetric 
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information, seasonability of demand in financial services and poor economic and 
financial policies (Yaron and Charitonenko 1999). 
2.3 Development of Financial Institutions and Systems 
While the Keynesian tradition dominated during the era of the subsidised credit, the 
development of financial institutions and systems approach to agricultural credit 
appeared at a time dominated by neoliberal policies.1 In this system, the role of 
government in giving credit is minimised, if not discouraged, while the focus tends to 
be more on how financial institutions can become sustainable. Sustainability, impact 
and outreach to the poor are normally considered th primary goals of financial 
institutions and they are reached through innovative methods executed in a stable 
macroeconomic environment.  
2.3.1 Goals of financial institutions: sustainability, outreach and impact  
Success or performance of the financial institutions is measured by the level of their 
sustainability, outreach and impact on the poor. These concepts of sustainability, 
outreach and impact, have been adopted by microfinance (see Figure 1) whereby the 
three goals are only achievable if the institutions operate under favourable 
macroeconomic and socio-political environment. Sustainability is the financial self-
sufficiency or the ability of the financial institution to provide durable services on a 
cost-recovering basis without depending on subsidie from donors (Klein et al. 1999). 
                                                
1 Neoliberalism, or the Washington Consensus, emphasizes reducing the role of the 
state in the economy while the market plays a central role (Williamson 2000). Post-
Washington Consensus added that the state had a role in building institutions that were fit to 
effectively participate in the market (Stiglitz 1998).Chang (2003) took the agenda of 
institutions further when he maintained that institutions mattered and that the market was just 
but one of the institutions created by the state, th  latter of which was also an institution. For 
Chang, markets are based on institutions and it is the e institutions that determine who can 
participate in the market, (i.e. the rules of the game). Some institutions determine legitimate 
objects of market exchange, while others define each agent’s area, rights and obligations. 
Some institutions monitor the process of exchange such as fraud, others (namely politics), 
legitimate the operation of these institutions. The approach of development of financial 
institutions and systems, with its emphasis on institutional development, is not very much 
divorced from the environment in which it was born. 
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Sustainability is reached when the return on equity, or net of subsidies received, 
equals or exceeds the opportunity costs of the equity funds (Yaron and Charitonenko 
1999). Outreach refers to the extent to which a finncial institution extends high 
quality financial services to a large number of poor clients (breath of outreach) and 
the poorest (i.e. depth of outreach) (Klein t al. 1999; Zeller and Meyer 2002). Impact 
refers to the depth of the outreach but is usually difficult to measure. Innovations are 
the means through which financial institutions can attain the three goals. 
Figure 1: Means, goals and context of finance institutions - Adapted from Zeller and 
Meyer 2002. 
                                                        
2.3.2 Means: Institutional Innovations 
Studies by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) on innovations in 
group-based banking in Bangladesh (specifically, the Grameen Bank), Malawi, 
Madagascar and Cameroon found three important things about innovation. These 
included savings arrangements, group approaches and demand-oriented financial 
services (Zeller and Sharma 1998). 
Experience from the studied countries shows that savings arrangements are an 
important part of a sustainable financial program for the poor. That being the case, it 
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is necessary for products to be diversified in order to provide savings service to as 
many poor clients as possible. (Zeller and Sharma 1998). A study by Nguyen et al. 
(2002) conducted in Burkina Faso showed that providing savings services to assist 
poor households to smooth consumption might be a more effective way of helping the 
poor than giving them loans for specific purposes. This study showed that demand for 
financial services was shaped by gender and by economic opportunity. Semboja 
(2004), basing on apexes or second-tier banks or national development funds in 
Senegal and Tanzania, showed that no amount of credit ould help the poor to find a 
way out of poverty if there was no economic opportunity. The author concluded that 
“It is infusion of credit into an atmosphere of economic opportunity that creates 
income, potential and prosperity,” (Semboja 2004, 877).  
Group approaches is the second lesson drawn from the IFPRI report (Zeller and 
Sharma 1998). Traditional banking systems prefer collateral in the form of mortgages 
on real property, which requires clear land titles and mortgage registration (Klein et
al. 1999).  While within traditional banking system the agent of a rural bank branch 
directly negotiates savings or credit agreements between the retail banking institution 
and the individual, in an innovative approach, a loca  institution negotiates between 
the bank and the individual. It also assumes the responsibilities of screening, 
monitoring and enforcing the repayment of loans, functions that would normally be 
constraining and expensive for the bank agent to carry out. Most schemes make 
members jointly liable for the repayment of loans ad do not give subsequent loans 
unless full loan repayment is made (Zeller and Sharma 1998). The prospect of access 
to subsequent loans has proved to be one of the most powerful incentives to loan 
repayment. However, group lending demands that the groups be homogenous in 
composition, interests and objectives in order to reduce problems of moral hazard. 
Since most farmer groups in many countries do not meet these conditions, due to the 
long duration of agricultural loans and high costs of training, individual lending in 
agricultural finance is preferred to group lending (Klein et al. 1999).  
The third lesson drawn from the IFPRI study was that demand-oriented financial 
services increased outreach to the poor. Lending services should only aim at 
increasing productivity but should also be diversified to include income-generating 
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activities while covering consumption needs such as health, education and social 
obligations (Zeller and Sharma 1998). Outreach can also be affected by the way the 
targeted clients perceive the costs and benefits offered by the institution. In Stanton's  
(2002) analysis of client demand and targeting effici ncy of Mexican financial 
institutions, she found out that client perceptions could be affected by the way the 
product was designed. Complicated procedures increased transaction costs and then 
scared away the poor clients while the wealthy and non-targeted clients took 
advantage of the cheap loans (Stanton 2002). This con equently reduced outreach to 
the poor.  
2.3.3 Context: Stable Macroeconomic and Socio-political Environment 
A stable socio-political and macroeconomic environme t is an essential prerequisite 
for the good performance of financial institutions and ensuring rural development and 
effective poverty reduction (International Fund forAgricultural Development [IFAD] 
2004; Yaron and Benjamin 2002; Klein et al. 1999). Important features of a 
conducive environment include the following: “...macroeconomic stability; 
deregulated interest rates, exchanges rates and agricultural prices; and a legal system 
that protects property and land-use rights, the autonomy of financial institutions and 
regulatory authorities, and due legal process” (IFAD 2004, 18). Yaron and Benjamin 
(2002) maintained that governments’ main role in supporting financial markets should 
be mostly indirect. This would entail creating a favourable policy environment and 
strengthening the legal and regulatory framework. Lack of such an environment yields 
negative results such as poor enforcement of contracts, which, in turn, increases 
uncertainty and reduces the expected returns to credito s (Yaron and Benjamin 2002).  
Klein et al. (1999) considered that client trust and loyalty is fostered when a financial 
institution has an effective governance and management structure that protects it 
against political interference and distortions induced by government and donor 
interests. However, there is less agreement on the need and the extent to which 
governments should be involved in the direct provisi n of financial services when 
there is serious market failure. For instance, that state-owned agricultural 
development banks receive special privileges is regarded as creating unfair 
competition (Klein et al. 1999). 
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2.3.4 Case Studies 
Banrural Bank of Guatemala is one institution that s managed to effectively 
combine financial and development goals by managing to remain financially 
sustainable while offering financial services to poor, rural, and agricultural clients 
(Trivelli 2007, cited in World Bank 2007). The bank, which mainly works outside 
Guatemala City, was created in 1997 after the closure of a poorly performing state-
owned bank. Half its clients are women and it uses v rnacular languages to 
communicate with its illiterate indigenous clients. About 70% is privately owned, 
while only 30% is owned by the state. The state provides no direct subsidies to 
Banrural. The 70% is shared among five types of stock, each represented in the board 
of directors. The bank has 10 board seats that are divided among the various 
stakeholders. The state has three seats. The rest of the seats are shared by various 
organisations which include unions, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), 
microfinance organisations and former workers of the closed stated bank among 
others. This governance model has empowered the private stakeholders and balanced 
goals of financial sustainability and rural development. It is also sustainable because 
the board and equity makeup cannot be changed significantly over time.  By adapting 
financial technologies to its clientele but without losing its identity as a bank, Barural 
mobilised its rural clients to deposit funds. By 2007 its profits were coming from a 
high volume of small transactions, mostly in rural areas. The bank also acts as a 
second-tier bank as it provides credit to more than 150 institutions. In this way, 
Barural managed to increase its outreach to the rural poor, an objective which the 
former state-owned bank of Guatemala failed to achieve (Trivelli 2007, cited in 
World Bank 2007). 
BRI of Indonesia is one of the state-owned agricultura  development banks that 
reformed successfully. The reform required attainmet of operational autonomy and 
freedom from political interference and this was achieved through the establishment 
of appropriate legal and regulatory framework as well as effective internal control and 
external supervision, (Seibel 2000). 
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2.3.5 Summary and critique of the two approaches to agricultural credit 
The two main approaches to agricultural credit include: 1) the policy of giving 
farmers cheap credit through development banks but without the worry of the loan 
repayment and sustainability of the concerned banks d, 2) the more recent policy of 
the development of finance which puts emphasis on the viability of financial 
institutions. Both approaches tend to assume extreme positions. The policy on cheap 
credit shows that credit is important for agricultural development but forgets that 
credit dries up if the supplying institution is not viable. The policy on development of 
financial institutions shows that viability of finacial institution is critical but tends to 
diminish the importance of giving credit to the poor as focus is thrust on recovering 
loans. Since this approach encourages the poor to borr w in homogenous groups it 
becomes difficult for farmers since they are not usually homogenous, given that their 
crops, land sizes and terrain may differ (cf. 2.3.2). Many case studies carried out have 
shown that not all is smooth with regards to this new approach. That poor borrowers 
have to operate in groups has often led to conflict in the communities especially when 
some of the members failed to pay back the loans (Zeller and Sharma 1998, Bond 
1998). On the overall, there is need to balance both approaches so that farmers are 
given credit but ways should also be sought to ensur  that financiers remain 
sustainable.  
2.4 Extending Credit under a Hyperinflationary Environm ent 
What would it mean to give loans under hyperinflationary conditions? Some lessons 
can be drawn from international experience and theory regarding hyperinflation.   
2.4.1 Definition, causes and cures for hyperinflation 
Definition and Characteristics 
Inflation is generally classified as a sustained increase in the cost of living and is 
usually thought of in terms of changes in Consumer Price Index (CPI) (Siklos 2000). 
While there is no precise definition of hyperinflation which is accepted everywhere, 
one definition that academics side with is that by Cagan (1956, cited in Siklos 2000). 
It considers hyperinflation as beginning when inflation exceeds 50% a month and 
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ending when it is less than 50% in every month during at least one year. Most 
economists refer to hyperinflation as that inflationary cycle without any tendency 
toward equilibrium, creating a vicious circle in whic  more and more inflation is 
triggered with each iteration of the cycle.  
Several countries experienced hyperinflation in the 20th Century. In the 1920s, the list 
of countries that experienced hyperinflation included Austria, Germany, Hungary and 
Poland. China and Greece had it in the 1940s. In the 1980s, Bolivia (1984-85), 
Nicaragua (1988-89), Yugoslavia and Poland (1989) all experienced hyperinflation 
(Solimano 1990). More recent examples include Peru (1988-99), Brazil (in the early 
1990s), Argentina (1999-2002) and currently, Zimbabwe (since 2007). In describing 
hyperinflation in Germany, Solimano stated that all the characteristic elements of 
hyperinflation were present:  
(1) a complete domestic demonetization and a shift of portfolios toward foreign 
currency; (2) an increase in the fiscal deficit (mostly because of the decreased 
real tax revenue arising from the fiscal lag), which in turn accelerated the 
expansion of domestic credit, fuelling inflation and generating an unstable 
inflationary process; (3) the destruction of the existing structure of wage 
contracts (the duration of contracts was drastically curtailed as a result of de 
facto pegging to the exchange rate); (4) a very rapid depreciation of the 
exchange rate; and (5) a decrease in the indices of physical production and in 
real wages, and an increase in unemployment. (Solimano 1990, 168-9) 
 Causes and Cure of Hyperinflation 
Economists generally agree that inflation is basically  monetary phenomenon 
(Friedman 1992). Hyperinflation is caused by governme ts which, when they can no 
longer fund their deficits from tax revenue, resort to limitlessly and continuously 
borrowing from the central bank. If the central bank is weak in terms of firmness on 
monetary policy, the only option it usually has is that of printing money to fund the 
revenues of the fiscal authorities. This begets inflation and when it gathers speed, 
government wants to stay ahead of the inflation and of inflationary expectations so 
that it can continuously have its revenues funded. According to Siklos (2000), such a 
setup suggests a theoretical possibility that inflation can be explosive because past 
inflation leads to more future inflation as the central bank responds to the 
government’s need to print money, its only source of revenues. 
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In his account of Bulgaria’s two-month hyperinflation of 1997, Slavova (2003) 
subscribed to the argument that a government which takes over control of the 
monetary policy to fund its expenditures creates hyperinflation. Prior the 
hyperinflation, the Bulgarian government interfered on several occasions in direct 
monetary policymaking, which demonstrated that central bank independence was 
mere rhetoric. According to Slavova, all government interventions were not so much 
for exploiting potential Phillip’s Curve trade-offs prior to elections, but for funding 
budget deficits both explicitly, in form of direct redits extended by the central bank, 
and implicitly, by encouraging state-owned banks to refinance loss-making state-
owned enterprises. Bulgaria started to print money to finance budget deficits and give 
direct loans to the state budgets in December 1996. By January 1997 the inflation rate 
had risen to 49% and it reached 243% the following month (Slavova 2003). 
According to some analysts, a combination of weak governments, civil disorder and 
unrest usually produces a conducive environment for hyperinflation to develop (Capie 
1986, cited in Siklos 2000; Cooper and Kempf 2001). Specifically, Cooper and 
Kempf maintained that hyperinflation was a sign of a divided society. The authors 
viewed that hyperinflation was the manifestation of a tragedy of commons in a 
divided society with a weak central monetary authori y or a decentralised monetary 
policy. In such a society, special interest groups can pressurise a weak central 
government to issue money to fund their own demands while neglecting the country’s 
overall welfare. Lessons from Argentina show that either a currency board or 
dollarization can remove this bias (Cooper and Kempf 2001). Dollarization is a 
monetary system in which a country substitutes United States dollars for its own 
currency while it hands over control of its monetary policy to the United States. The 
term ‘dollarization’ is also a shorthand for the use of any type of foreign currency in 
transactions among residents (IMF 2009). 
Economists generally accept that remedies for hyperinflation have to do with 
discipline in both fiscal and monetary policies. Onthe one hand, government needs to 
formulate and faithfully implement fiscal policies that respect a budget constraint 
without resorting to excessive monetary expansion. O  the other hand, the monetary 
policy should be firm enough to resist financing the government’s budget. However, 
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both these measures can only work if the public demonstrates confidence in these 
policies (Siklos 2000).   
2.4.2 Extending credit 
Some studies suggest that where there is hyperinflation, priority should be placed, not 
on improving credit extension and conditions, but rather on reducing the 
macroeconomic volatility (Dehesa et al. 2007). However, the answer to this question 
is interlinked with causes of hyperinflation, whereby some governments without any 
tax revenues resort to printing money to fund projects or budgets they perceive as 
important. According to Godoy and De Franco (1992), economic analysts associated 
this behaviour with populist governments of Latin America. For Ladman and 
Tinnermeier (1981), private transfers of concessionary loans for agricultural purposes 
are magnified when there is inflation and this encourages government to use them to 
gain patronage of borrowers, and conversely, for  borrowers to pledge support to 
government. There are, therefore, two tendencies regarding extension of credit under 
hyperinflationary conditions: 1) focus on stabilizat on by analysts, and 2) focus on 
cheap credit by populist governments.  
Focus on stabilization by analysts 
A theoretical and cross-country empirical analysis regarding the factors leading to 
financial deepening by Dehesa et al. (2007) showed that a high rate of domestic credit 
to the private sector (measured as a percentage of GDP) was associated with stronger 
credit rights and lower inflation. These authors considered that the development of 
credit markets was, to a large extent, a direct reflection of financial deepening that led 
to the overall level of economic development. Since banks are more willing to extend 
credit to the private sector when they have appropriate tools to enforce the repayment 
of loans by seizing collateral or even gaining contr l of the bankrupt firm, (Townsend 
1979), the issue of credit rights protection becomes an important determinant factor. 
The study by Dehesa et al. (2007) also showed that improvement of credit rights 
protection had little effects in an environment where inflation rate was increasing. 
This is mainly because inflation is expected to have  negative impact on financial 
deepening at least to the extent that it erodes the real value of outstanding financial 
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assets. Lack of macroeconomic stability triggers uncertainty about borrowers’ ability 
to meet their obligations, while higher uncertainty ensures credit suppliers reallocate 
resources away from risky projects. In a hyperinflationary environment, borrowers 
can be denied credit even if they are willing to pay interest at above market rates, 
creating a credit-constrained equilibria. In conclusion, Dehesa et al. (2007) suggested 
that in a high inflationary environment, efforts should focus on controlling inflation 
and ensuring macroeconomic stability. Once these obj ctives are achieved, the focus 
of attention should shift to strengthening creditor rights and improving credit 
information management, which is viewed as eventually leading to development of 
credit market for economic development. 
According to Fanelli (2003), when negative shocks reduce firms’ net worth and 
consequently increase the probability of financial distress, creditors react by shifting 
their demand toward asset with short-term maturity. This enables them to easily 
monitor the behaviour of debtors in such uncertain environments.  These observations 
by Fanelli (2003) were based on the Argentinean ecoomic crisis.  
Focus on cheap loans by populist governments 
Ladman and Tinnermeier (1981) argued that agricultural credit programmes in 
developing countries could be used for political purposes even though they were said 
to promote economic development. According to them, credit programmes tempt 
politicians to exploit them because they are easy to es ablish and administer and are 
legitimate for economic objectives. In addition, the true use of the credit is difficult to 
see because money can be used in diverse ways that may not be easy to trace. Ladman 
and Tinnermeier developed five reasons to support their claim:  
First, governments typically control the formal market supply of agricultural 
credit through development banks and credit policies which force private sector 
lending to agriculture. Therefore, governments have the ability to influence 
strongly the distribution and allocation of credit. Second, concessionary interest 
rate policies, which are almost ubiquitous in LDC [Less Developing Countries], 
agricultural credit programs provide for an attractive income transfer to 
borrowers. Third, when governments permit long-term delinquency, a common 
condition in LDCs, the borrower receives a temporary income transfer for the 
period of the delinquency. If he never repays, it becomes a permanent transfer. 
Fourth, when inflation is present, the magnitude of the concessionary and 
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delinquency transfers is magnified. Fifth, the advantages of obtaining these 
transfers are sufficiently attractive that they canbe used by governments to gain 
patronage of borrowers and, conversely, by borrowers to pledge support to 
government. (Ladman and Tinnermeier 1981, 66)  
The fourth reason mentioned by Ladman and Tinnermeier r fer to a situation where 
there is inflation, namely that the loans transferred are increased in accordance with 
the demand schedule. Inflationary conditions increase the benefits of those who 
receive the transfers. The increased benefits or additional transfers also enhance the 
attractiveness of using credit for political objectives. The mere environment of cheap 
loans or concessionary transfers is conducive for gr oming corruption as government 
officials can easily have part of the transfers for themselves directly or indirectly by 
lending to themselves or by receiving bribes from borrowers. With its control of the 
formal market supply of agricultural credit, a government can utilise such transfers to 
promote certain economic activity and/or to influenc  certain behaviour among the 
loan recipients. The bottom-line in all this is that the borrower gains income at the 
expense of the taxpayer or saver whose money is used to provide credit.   Ladman and 
Tinnermeier (1981) applied this theoretical framework in a case study of Bolivia and 
concluded that in the political context of that country, large income transfers were 
made to a few influential farmers, a situation which strongly suggested that political 
factors were important in allocating credit intended for income distribution, 
development, and debilitation of financial institutions. 
Bolivia’s former President Suazo addressing George Jackson Eder, crystallises the 
key issues of the debate regarding what has to be traded off between propelling 
economic development agenda even if it leads to hyperinflation and, maintaining a 
low inflation even when it means a rise in unemployment. He wrote, “You have given 
us stabilization, but at the price of economic development” (Eder 1968, cited in 
Godoy and De Franco 1992, 618). According to Godoy and De Franco (1992), when 
Bolivia experienced hyperinflation from 1982-5, years later after the former 
President’s remark, agriculture prospered during that period of macroeconomic 
volatility because the demand for food shot up due to increased government spending 
and larger public employment, following two decades of non-democratic rule, 
whereby workers’ demands were usually suppressed. The response of government led 
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to larger fiscal deficits, greater demand for food and to lower real wages. In 1983, 
Bolivia experienced drought conditions and this reduced food supply and the situation 
became worse when smallholders withdrew perishable foods from the 
(hyper)inflationary world, causing yet another rise in food prices. A Computable 
General Equilibrium model built by the Ministry of Planning of Bolivia indicated that 
expansionary fiscal policies benefited smallholders as every 2% increase in public 
expenditure increased real rural income by 0.4%. However, the hyperinflationary 
period did not experience a significant rise in terms of agricultural productivity. When 
hyperinflation ended, the momentary prosperity of agriculture also ended as 
stabilization removed incentives such as subsidised cr it and transport that helped 
agriculture. According to Godoy and De Franco (1992), some people believed that 
stabilization negatively affected the development of agriculture in Bolivia. However, 
the authors maintained that the populist policy of ‘cheap food’ for the people should 
have been backed by improvement of agricultural technology after stabilization. 
Basing on Sachs’ analysis of social conflict of populist policies in Latin America, 
Godoy and De Franco (1992) argued that the success of agriculture in Bolivia during 
the period of hyperinflation was temporary, given the ypical pattern of such policies 
in the region. According to Sachs (1989), policies n Chile, Peru, Brazil and 
Argentina, worked well but only for a short time. A study of these countries showed 
that at first, real wages, non-tradable production, and Gross National Product (GNP) 
improved and the real exchange rate appreciated. However, the growth failed abruptly 
after about one year, leaving these countries battling with serious distortions. 
Governments subsequently faced shortage of hard curency to fund their programmes. 
They resorted to printing money and this led to hyperinflation (Sachs 1989; Godoy 
and De Franco 1992).  
2.5 Issues raised and their relevance to the problem 
Three main issues have been raised in the literature s rveyed in this chapter. First, in 
the developing countries, Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, agriculture is considered 
essential for development. About 70% of the people in the region of Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Zimbabwe included), depend on agriculture for their livelihood. It is, 
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therefore, important for governments of these countries to formulate and seriously 
implement progressive agricultural policies and propel development in the region.  
Second, the financial sector can contribute to agriculture through agricultural credit 
but findings from literature show that there was once an emphasis on extending cheap 
credit to farmers without much attention on repayment and viability of the supplier 
institutions. Later on, there was an inverse tendency of emphasizing repayment and 
viability of the financial institutions while little attention was given to the extension of 
credit. As we pointed out earlier on (see 2.3.5), both approaches tend to go to 
extremes. There is need to strike a balance.  
Third, the chapter has discussed what it may mean for a country to extend credit under 
hyperinflationary conditions. Under hyperinflationary conditions, analysts prioritise 
stabilization as opposed to credit extension. However, populist governments have 
historically tended to focus on extending cheap loans, in the name of economic 
development, to their interest groups for political purposes. Studies of Latin American 
countries that went through economic crises demonstrated that the fruits of such 
development initiatives do not last long and that without stabilization, agricultural 
credit cannot bring about a lasting economic development.  
In a nutshell: the chapter has established that only through well-functioning financial 
institutions operating under a stable macroeconomic environment can extension of 
agricultural credit lead to development. Given the high levels of hyperinflation that 
Zimbabwe had between 2007 and 2008, its economy could not, by any way, be 
described as stable. What would it mean to extend cre it under such an environment 
and how developed were its financial institutions? 
  




3 Case Study Methodology 
While the literature review has sought to bring outinternational experience regarding 
agricultural credit in general and in a hyperinflationary context, this study seeks to 
narrow down the focus and concentrate on Zimbabwe's experience of hyperinflation 
between 2007 and 2008. The researcher employed a qualitative case study 
methodology to gather and analyse the data used in this study and tried as much as 
possible to adhere to the requirements of the tradition of this methodology.  
3.1 Choice of study approach and methodology 
After considering both quantitative and qualitative approaches, this researcher found 
qualitative methodology more suitable to use since the aim was to explore the many 
factors that impacted on agricultural credit under the volatile macroeconomic 
environment in the country. While a quantitative research study deals with few 
variables but many cases, a qualitative research uses few cases but many variables 
(Ragin 1994).  Creswell (1998) described a qualitative research as that which employs 
distinct methodological traditions of research in order to explore a social or human 
problem. For him, a qualitative researcher builds a complex and holistic picture of the 
unit of analysis, a process which involves analyzing words, reporting detailed views 
of informants and conducting interviews in a natural setting. As required by a 
qualitative approach, the researcher carried out this research, not as an ‘expert’ who 
passes judgment on participants, but as an active learner who could tell the story from 
the participant’s view (Creswell 1998, 18). In this re earch informants are the experts 
of the issue under inquiry. Most informants felt at e se and confident to share their 
views after this researcher clarified their role in the research.  
Though a qualitative study can be carried out using other designs or methodologies 
such as ethnographic method and grounded theory, the researcher considered a case 
study design as best suitable since it afforded one t  r ach a profound understanding 
of the issue under analysis.  It demands extensive gathering of material from multiple 
sources of information in order to provide an in-depth picture of the unit of analysis 
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Creswell (1998). It was with this understanding that this researcher focused only on 
one country. The choice of Zimbabwe was mainly because it was the only country in 
the region (of Sub-Saharan Africa) that was experiencing hyperinflationary conditions 
at the time of study. This outstanding characteristic of Zimbabwe makes this paper a 
unique case study (Creswell 1998). The fieldwork involved collecting information 
from various key stakeholders from the agricultural sector in order to establish what it 
meant to extend credit under volatile macroeconomic conditions mainly characterised 
by hyperinflation.  However, it was not always easy to get access to stakeholder 
institutions, which, in turn, were to provide this researcher with key informants. 
3.2 Sampling and the challenges encountered 
The study was initially designed to tackle the research problem by exploring the 
experience of the Agricultural Development Bank of Zimbabwe (Agribank) only. 
However, the researcher received no response to the request for permission, despite 
several follow-ups with Agribank for more than three months. Seeking views of key-
stakeholder institutions in the agricultural sector of Zimbabwe successfully became 
the way forward. The headquarters of most of the various institutions that were 
identified as key-stakeholders were located in Harare, the capital city of Zimbabwe 
which resulted in the fieldwork being conducted in this region. 
The institutions approached were located within the Central Business District and in 
the outskirts of the city of Harare. While the researcher might have anticipated 
possible key stakeholder institutions for participation in the research, the snowball 
sampling method, a strategy that helps to identify key-informants with rich 
information through the help of people who know them (Miles and Huberman 1994), 
proved to dominate as respondents referred the researcher from one institution to 
another. Generally, many of the institutions that were approached showed readiness to 
participate in the research. Only a few were difficult to penetrate due to gatekeepers 
but some prior research which afforded the researchr to know who to ask for from 
the onset proved helpful.  A total of eleven institutions participated in the research as 
they provided key-informants (see Appendix 1). 
P a g e | 28 
 
 
At most of these institutions, the researcher was refer ed to a key informant after 
briefly explaining the objectives of the research. After the interviews, most of the 
respondents willingly suggested other possible respondents that they considered 
knowledgeable. Except for two interviews, one of which was held in December 2008 
and the other in March 2009, the rest of the interviews were done in the month of June 
2009, a time when most people considered the time of hyperinflation as over.  
3.3 Data Collection Techniques 
According to Mikkelsen (1995), data collected in a case study should lead to an in-
depth understanding of the object under study. To arrive at this, the study employed 
several data collection techniques, namely, semi-structured interviews, fieldwork 
notes, observations during the fieldwork (Yin 1994) and a group interview with 
smallholder farmers. All the respondents willingly agreed to participate when they 
understood that it was solely for academic purposes. However, one respondent 
refused to sign a consent form even though he did not hesitate to participate. The sole 
reason he gave was that signing such a form would require too much protocol and 
formalities that might have delayed the interview. Two interviewees explicitly 
requested to remain anonymous in the final report.  
Most of the information acquired from the study was from semi-structured interviews 
with key informants. This interview technique proved useful because it allowed 
respondents to elaborate their fixed choice answers (Pawson 1996). The semi-
structured interviews were recorded on audio-tape with respondents’ consent. Audio 
recording ensured accuracy in the write-up of the repo t since some information could 
have been missed during note taking. In addition, it gave the researcher the 
opportunity to establish eye-contact with the respondent, instead of being grossly 
engaged in note-taking which would have disturbed the relaxed mood of interviews. 
The data sourced was meant to answer the central question: what has been the 
experience of stakeholders regarding the supply and demand of agricultural credit 
under current macroeconomic conditions? To guide th interview, several sub-
questions were formulated and asked, depending on the type of respondent (see  
Appendix 2). In terms of content, respondents were more willing to share their 
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experiences and views than the documents of their institutions, especially where 
figures were involved. However, this did not constitute a huge problem since the main 
interest in the study was to establish their views as knowledgeable people who 
belonged to institutions that played a key role in supporting agricultural activities in 
the country. 
3.4 Data Analysis 
This researcher used two main topical questions to analyse and discuss the data 
collected in the field: 1) what themes emerged from gathering information about 
agricultural credit? These questions helped the resarcher to identify and group the 
information for discussion. 2) How can one interpret these themes in the light of the 
broad debate regarding agricultural credit and hyperinflation and what lessons can be 
drawn (Lincoln and Guba 1985) from the Zimbabwean cse?  
The analysis process began soon after fieldwork by arranging field notes and 
transcribing interviews recorded on audio tape. A content analysis was made of the 
transcribed material and the notes collected in the field.  The interview question 
guide, whose formulation was based on the conceptual frameworks of agricultural 
credit and a hyperinflationary environment discussed in the previous chapter, also 
served as a guide in grouping the information and identifying emerging themes. In 
this report, coded references are made to acknowledge or credit both specific 
views/opinions and direct quotes of respective respondents. In the referencing system, 
each respondent is replaced with a code letter and the date when he/she was 
interviewed (e.g. H, 03/06/09). These codes are included on the list of the respondents 
(see Appendix 1). Information that could not fit ino the identified themes led the 
researcher to revisit the literature review in order to find ways of reporting it without 
changing its context.  
The researcher then interpreted the categorised themes in the light of the reviewed 
literature. This entailed picking out the issues that the researcher considered most 
critical and seeing if findings from international experience could inform the study at 
hand or vice versa. The objective of the analysis process was, according to the case 
study tradition, to arrive at lessons learnt from the respondents’ experiences.  
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3.5 Issues arising from the limitations of the study 
The researcher did not manage to interview a few stakeholders that could have added 
further information to the study. The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) is one 
important stakeholder absent in the list of the institutions successfully approached. 
Additionally The Commercial Farmers Union has supported large scale commercial 
farmers in a significant way but had no one made themselves available for interview 
during the period of fieldwork. However, the Zimbabwe Farmers’ Union that appears 
in the list also represents commercial farmers but at a general level. 
A gender analysis of the profile of the respondents shows that there is sharp 
imbalance. All the respondents from the institutions were male, except for three 
women who formed part of the group interview. It might be too early or even 
inaccurate to judge from this single scenario that women are poorly represented in 
these organizations unless a specific gender-based study is made to interrogate the 
question further. However, it is a cause for concer that in all the eleven institutions 
visited, the snowball method landed this researcher on male key informants only. The 
limitation arising from this is that women views regarding their experience of credit 
under hyperinflation may be poorly represented even though research shows that 
about 40% of the households in the rural areas are female-headed (AGRITEX 2002, 
cited in Horrel and Krishnan 2007). 
The politically polarised environment in which the research was carried out might not 
have been conducive for getting optimum responses from some of the respondents. 
Some respondents requested anonymity when they considered their opinions to be 
politically sensitive. It could be the case that some might not have fully expressed 
their views if they considered them dissenting.  
This preceding issue of the context in which the research took place establishes a link 
with the next chapter, which provides a background a macroeconomic context of 
agricultural credit. This helps to assess the findings in their proper context. 
  




4 Background and Context of Agricultural Credit in Zi mbabwe 
From the colonial times (1890-1979) to the post-independence period (1980 to the 
present), the fall and rise of the agricultural sector in Zimbabwe has been determined 
by land ownership and control (Ndlela and Robinson 2007). The period between the 
1997 and 2008 is that of the deepening economic crisis. This is the context in which 
agricultural credit is discussed in this paper, butspecial attention is made on the 
period of hyperinflation (2007-2008).  
4.1 Background 
4.1.1 Colonial Era 
The colonial era lasted from 1890-1980).2  Key periods regarding various policies 
established during this period are summarised on appendix 3. The colonial era created 
a dualistic system of agriculture. Under this system, a minority group of white settlers 
occupied vast and fertile lands and enjoyed various f rms of farming support. The 
vast majority of Africans were pushed to a small percentage of less productive land 
and no support was generally given to them (Ndlela and Robinson 2007). This setup 
meant that only white farmers could be large scale ommercial farmers and Africans 
(blacks) constituted the bulk of smallholder farmers. The colonial regime created 
several discriminatory policies that disadvantaged the black majority. The Land 
Apportionment Act of 1930 led to the forceful removal of the majority blacks from 
arable land to arid rural areas that were then referred to as “Reserves” or “Tribal Trust 
Lands” ( now known as Communal Areas), creating room f r white farmers to occupy 
massive farming areas (Bond 1998). The Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 was 
                                                
2  Different colonial regimes controlled the country at various given times. The colonial regimes 
of Zimbabwe can be outlined as follows: The British South Africa Company (1890-1923), Southern 
Rhodesia self-government under white minority (1923-1953), Federal of Northern and Southern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953-1963) and Unilateral Dec aration of Independence of Rhodesian regime 
(1965-1979) (see Ndlela and Robinson 2007). 
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enacted to perpetuate this discriminatory policy. The Act sought to replace communal 
land owned by traditional chiefs with more productive black farmers in the name of 
land conservation and reducing overcrowding of peasant lands (Bond 1998). In 
reality, the colonial government wanted “to substitute an African agrarian bourgeoisie 
and proletariat for the peasantry,” (Arrighi 1973, 362).  
Agricultural support policies during the colonial era clearly favoured the white 
farmers. As far back as 1908, the country’s Department of Agriculture was 
reorganised to give technical support to while farmers. In 1912, a Land Bank was 
created to provide credit facilities to white farmers so that they could purchase farms, 
livestock and farm equipment. No loans were extended to African (black) farmers on 
the grounds that they did not have any collateral (Ndlela and Robinson 2007). 
However, small loan schemes for blacks were started but they never brought any 
significant change given the discriminatory structures in place which deprived blacks 
of any financial muscles. Some of these include the housing credit scheme supported 
by the Plewman Commission, which failed due to “a combination of volatile liquidity 
and limited buying power” (Bond 1998, 75). The African Loan and Development 
Company founded in 1961, even though meant to benefit th  disadvantaged blacks, 
had interest rates that were higher than were available to white farm borrowers 
(Whitsun Foundation, 1980). Silveira House, a Catholic Mission, started a rural 
savings club movement for homogenous groups (e.g. church members or same 
village) but was never fully executed, “in no small part because the concomitant 
imposition of market rationality was not feasible under the circumstances”, (Bond 
1998). 
In 1971, under the interventionist policies of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence of Rhodesia (UDI), the Land bank was transformed into Agricultural 
Finance Corporation (AFC), which also continued to pr vide heavy loans to white 
commercial farmers. Due to the sanctions that it was facing from the international 
community, the UDI government adopted import substitution policies to ensure food 
self-sufficiency. In order to achieve this, it invest d in the white farmers whom it 
heavily funded through AFC and commercial banks. AFC’s mandate excluded 
provision of service to the communal areas (the then Tribal Trust Lands). A slight 
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change only came in 1978 when AFC started extending credit to few African farmers 
that had purchased small scale commercial farms in the African Purchase Areas. This 
decision came as a result of the political changes that were taking place in the country 
at that time, notably, the political settlement.3 Commercial banks also offered supply-
led services to agriculture but solely to the white minority, which had collateral 
security (Doré et al. 2008).  
4.1.2 Control Regime (1980-1990) 
Under the leadership of Robert Mugabe, the ZANU (PF) Government that took over 
as majority rule at independence in 1980 pursued socioeconomic development and 
redistributive objectives that gave rise to a large public sector and increased 
Government spending on health, education and welfare programmes. Zimbabwe’s 
average growth in the 1980s was 4.3% per annum and its economy had its own 
moments of boom (due to political and social factors) and recession (on account of 
climatic conditions) (Doré et al. 2008).  
In the agricultural sector, the new Government started a land redistribution scheme. It 
bought farms from white farmers and resettled black smallholder farmers in what 
became known as Resettlement Areas. However, Government discontinued the land 
acquisition programme in 1985 (Ndlela and Robinson 2007). According to Jenkins 
(1997), by leaving the issue of redistribution to a later stage, the post-independence 
populist Government sidelined black empowerment. This means that in terms of 
structures, dualism in agriculture was basically maintained. Because there were no 
structural changes made, it was therefore, not surpri ing that the AFC project of 
funding smallholder farmers did not come to fruition. As Bond (1998, 320) put it, the 
AFC programme was simply not geared to the existing realities facing small farmers:  
unpredictable markets for small farmer products; barriers and bottlenecks in input 
                                                
3  The political unrest that had mounted within the country, coupled with sanctions levelled 
again Smith’s government of Unilateral Declaration f Independence (UDI) of Rhodesia by the 
International community and political pressure from South Africa, Britain and the United States, led 
the Rhodesian to reach an internal settlement with less radical nationalists.  
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provision, product marketing and distribution, transport and communications; 
drought; and all manner of other non-economic factors”. Government also extended 
credit facilities through AFC and extension services (through Agricultural Technical 
Extension Services [AGRITEX]) to the smallholder farmers. Like the previous 
colonial regime, Government pursued a policy of import substitution and food self-
sufficiency. 
Since the smallholder farmers in both communal and resettlement areas had no 
collateral security and posed a risk in terms of high administrative costs, owing to 
their big numbers but small transactions, Government stepped in to guarantee the 
losses and costs of AFC (Poulton et al 2002). Of the estimated 850 000 smallholder 
farmers, only about 70 000 received AFC loans by 1984 (Bond 1998) and about 
77 000 smallholder farmer households received the loans by 1986 (Poulton et al. 
2002). Repayment of these loans was low due to problems with poor management and 
poor supervision of lending as well as poor harvest yields (Poulton et al. 2002). Due 
to a backlog of hybrid maize varieties, expanded access to credit, higher guaranteed 
Government maize prices, and marketing subsidies, smallholder farmers managed to 
double maize production during 1980-86 (Eicher 1995). However, the belief among 
many smallholder farmers in the early years of independence that credit was a right 
instead of a commercial contract that needed to be honoured led to delinquency and 
default (Poulton et al 2002).  The smallholder farmers overtook commercial farmers 
in providing national food security as they contributed about 90% of the country’s 
maize and small grain production. In the 1989/90 cropping season, there was a sharp 
decrease in the number of loans. Only about 44 000 smallholder farmer households, 
compared to the 77 000 of 1986 received loans form AFC (Poulton et al. 2002, 47).  
Besides the repayment problem that AFC was facing, Government was also finding it 
difficult to capitalise this financial institution since it had too many competing needs 
Education and health sectors also needed funding. It also carried the burden of 
servicing external debts. These debts had accumulated in the early years of 
independence in the hopes that organizations and door countries that had pledged, 
just before independence, to help the country, would keep their promises (Jenkins 
1997). 
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In an assessment related to this era, Jenkins (2007) concluded that for Government, 
spending on social service was easier than embarking on a more demanding but 
critical task of restructuring the pattern of ownership in the economy. According to 
her, this approach led to future economic problems by generating large deficits, which 
needed to be financed, with either inflationary or crowding-out effects (or both), and 
with external debt implications. In a way, adoption f neoliberal policies became 
inevitable. 
4.1.3 Liberalization (1991-1996) 
This era saw Government shifting from the UDI colonial regime policies of import 
substitution that it had inherited at independence and tried to manage during the 1980s 
to neoliberal policies of economic liberalization (Doré et al. 2008). The Economic 
Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in Zimbabwe, hich led to the imposition 
of tariffs on manufacturing inputs, trade liberaliztion exposed manufacturing 
companies to foreign competition and this decreased pro uctivity. Privatization and 
fees for social services in the area of health and education were introduced and there 
was a decline in wages and employment. Money supply went up 35% from mid 1990 
to mid 1991 due to speculation. After the lifting of key price controls in early 1991, 
inflation broke national records to reach more than 30% (Bond 1998). Bank 
economists blamed it on price controls: they “did more to add to inflation and 
distortion of relative prices than it helped busines viability. This approach also puts 
into question the credibility of the whole programme [ESAP] in the eyes of the 
general public and market participants,” (Zimbank Review, Third Quarter 1991). The 
general impact of these neoliberal policies was a we kened economy characterised by 
“deindustrializing, with foreign competition increasing dramatically,” (Carmody and 
Taylor 2007, cited in Lee 2009, 6). This macroeconomic environment also affected 
the agricultural sector and financial services to the smallholder farmers in particular.  
The number of communal farmer households that receiv d loans from AFC had 
reduced to about 30 000 by 1990 and dropped to about 16 000 by 1996. In 
comparison with large scale commercial farmers, the majority of whom were white 
(even though a few blacks had purchased large farms fter independence), the value 
of the loans of the 30 000 smallholder farmers was only 1/7 that of the value of loans 
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to 1 100 commercial farmers (Eicher 1995; Poulton et al 2002). However, of these 
30 000, 80% were still found to be in arrears in 1990 (Chimedza 1994, cited in 
Poulton et al 2002). In an effort to adopt more commercial methods, AFC, with the 
help of the World Bank tried in vain to employ the group lending approaches, 
following microfinance success stories (Bond 1998). Rural savings clubs and contract 
farming schemes could barely replace the AFC loans that the smallholder farmers 
used to receive from AFC. Some of the factors that m de it difficult for smallholder 
farmers to repay included the  high interest rates nd tight monetary rules that were a 
result of ESAP, the drought of 1992 and the high cost f fertiliser after it was 
liberalised. AFC also faced the problem of interference as politicians instructed it to 
waive off the non-repaid loans (Poulton et al 2002). According to Bond (1998), AFC 
fell into the trap of the common flawed assumption by the traditional approach to 
rural finance, namely that farmers need credit to stimulate them to produce. AFC was 
later to be privatised in 1999. 
The story of the Cotton Marketing Board and cotton smallholder farmers during the 
period of liberalization appears to be a successful one. In 1992, the Cotton Board 
started an input credit scheme to help smallholder farmers. While by 1994 there were 
already 40 000 farmers benefiting from the scheme, th  number increased to 55 000 
by 1999 under Cottco (Cotton Company of Zimbabwe, formerly Cotton Marketing 
Board). The repayment rate was as high as 98% (Poulton et al 2002), almost a total 
contrast to the experience at the parastatal AFC. Nonetheless, the majority of the 
smallholder farmers remained without access to credit if one considers that there were 
an estimate of 850 000 households of smallholder farmers. 
4.2 Context of volatile macroeconomic conditions (1997-2008)  
The authors of a UNDP Zimbabwe discussion document, Doré et al. (2008), 
described the period between 1997 and 2008 as that of a deepening economic crisis. 
Several characteristics characterise this volatility but hyperinflation has been the main 
feature. The agricultural sector experienced negative growth and literature does not 
indicate any real improvement in terms of extension of credit to farmers.  
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4.2.1 Aspects of volatility 
The basic structural transformation of the national economy came in 1997 when 
Zimbabwe experienced an economic crisis that became worse after the post-2000 
events. Doré et al (2008) referred to this as the moment that defined a fundamental 
rupture with the country’s previous growth patterns. There are several events that 
contributed to the volatility of the economy. The crush of the Zimbabwean dollar on 
Friday, 14 November 1997 was one major factor. That day has since been referred to 
as the “Black Friday”. This was followed by the unbdgeted issuing of large sums of 
money (about Z$4.5 billion) to war veterans, leading to a budget deficit and inflation 
(Lee 2009). From 1998 to 2003, Zimbabwean soldiers fought a war in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo with an estimated cost rate of USD$1 Million per day. The fall of 
commercial agriculture after 2000, following the Fast Track Land Reform Programme 
(FTLRP) led to the decline in supply of domestic inputs and the national economy as 
a whole. Controversy surrounded the land reform programme implemented by 
Government in view of equitable agricultural development. Government also reversed 
liberalization policies and reintroduced interventio ist policies, with the intention of 
promoting private sector performance by providing cheap bank finance at negative 
interest rates. However, not much progress was made sinc  private sector also faced 
difficulties, for instance, lack of foreign exchange, fuel and power (Doré et al. 2008).  
Unemployment in the formal sector is now at 90% andinfrastructure has generally 
deteriorated. The country is now bankrupt. Its foreign debt has continued to grow and 
in April 2009, the Governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) admitted to 
having stolen money from foreign currency accounts of individuals and organizations 
to cover Government shortfalls (Lee 2009).  
4.2.2 Gross Domestic Product, Hyperinflation and Stabilisation 
Hyperinflation, the hallmark of Zimbabwe’s economic collapse (Hanke 2008), 
followed a continuous decline in productivity in the country. The initial contraction of 
the economy was largely associated with chaotic seizur  of commercial farms, the 
backbone of the economy, but other factors have also contributed in recent years. 
According to Coorey et al (2007), these factors included:  
P a g e | 38 
 
 
(i) high and accelerating inflation; (ii) price distortions due to extensive controls 
and regulation, particularly relating to the exchange rate which is fixed by the 
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) at a highly overvalued rate; (iii) the collapse 
of investor confidence due to unpredictable policies and lack of respect for 
property rights, particularly in agriculture and mining; and (iv) minimal external 
financing because of poor relations with creditors and donors and deteriorating 
economic and social conditions. (p. 4) 
As shown in Figure 2 (below), the economy shrunk in 1995 but has not recovered 
since the collapse in 1997. A period of negative growth started in 1999 and in 2003 
the economy reached a negative growth of 10%. The 2007 growth rate of about -7% 
showed no signs of immediate recovery, (Doré et al. 2008). The real GDP is 
estimated to have declined by about 30% between 1999 and 2007 (Coorey et al 2007). 
Figure 2 GDP growth rates 1994-2007 - (at 1990 prices) 
 
The deepest decline was experienced in 2008 when GDP reached close to -15%, while 
a slowdown of the decline is projected for 2009 (see Figure 3). Despite the expected 
recovery of some sectors, agriculture was not expected to experience positive growth 
in 2009.  
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Figure 3 Growth by sector (2000-2008) and projection for 2009 
 
Sources: Zimbabwean authorities and IMF staff estimates, (cited in IMF 2009). 
 
While production and growth declined, money-supply increased as the RBZ printed 
money that flooded the market and resulted in hyperinflation.  According to the 
official records of the Central Statistical office (see Figure 4), inflation reached 
hyperinflationary levels of over 1 000% in February 2007 (Doré et al. 2008). Coorey 
et al (2007) cautioned that the official CPI in Zimbabwe as likely to substantially 
understate inflation and that many in the private sector believed that the true rate of 
annual inflation was closer to 3,000% in February 2007. In mid-November 2008 
monthly rate of inflation was estimated at 79,6 billion percent (see Figure 5), making 
Zimbabwe the first country in the 21st Century to have such an inflation record  and 
second to Hungary in the list of the highest inflation records in the world’s history 
(Hanke and Kwok 2009).  
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Figure 4 Zimbabwe's CPI inflation, annual average, 2001-2007 
 
Source: Central Statistics Office in Doré et al. 2008. 
 
Figure 5 Zimbabwe's hyperinflation: March 2007 to Mid-November 2008 
 
Source: Hanke and Kwok 2009 
According to Munoz (2007), inflation was fuelled byrapid money growth due to the 
Quasi-fiscal activities of the RBZ since 2004. From her analysis, Munoz realised that 
the inflation of Zimbabwe was caused more by Quasi-fiscal activity by the bank than 
the normally presumed government budget deficits. The Quasi-fiscal activities of the 
central bank were carried out outside the budget and without adequate provisions for 
their financing (Munoz 2007). These activities supported concessionary funding 
mechanisms. Some of these mechanisms included Agricultural Sector Productivity 
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Enhancement Facility (ASPEF), the Basic Commodity Supply Side Intervention 
Facility (BACOSSI facility) and the Agricultural Mechanisation Programme (Malaba 
2008). Figure 6 is an example of some of the many bearers’ cheques that the RBZ 
printed. 
Figure 6 Zimbabwean bearer's cheques 
 
Source: anonymous. 
The restoration of fiscal discipline and introduction of stable monetary policies were 
considered to be some of the measures that Zimbabwe could take in order to stabilise 
its economy (Coorey et al 2007; Munoz 2007). According to Hanke (2008), since the 
source of Zimbabwe's hyperinflation was the RBZ's unlimited financing of 
Government spending, the solution lay in the central bank stopping to print money 
and immediately adopting a different monetary system, given that it had no ability, de 
facto, to resist Government's demands for cash. According to some IMF analysts, 
while better governance and a comprehensive structural reform (e.g. property rights, 
land and agriculture reform) might help to achieve a sustained growth, a general 
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stabilization process consisting several essential elements needed to be urgently set 
off: 
(i) a transfer of all quasi-fiscal activities to the government budget; (ii) strong 
fiscal adjustment, including newly-absorbed QFAs [Quasi-fiscal activities]; (iii) 
exchange rate unification and full liberalization of the exchange regime for 
current international payments and transfers; (iv) liberalization of price controls 
and imposition of hard budget constraints on public enterprises; and (v) a strong 
monetary anchor. (Coorey et al 2007, 14). 
When the inflation rose to about 79.6 billion percent in mid-November 2008, people 
simply refused to use the Zimbabwean dollar and hyperinflation came to an abrupt 
halt (Hanke 2009). The abrupt halt of the hyperinflation was also triggered by the 
intervention of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, which priced the country’s economy 
via the Old Mutual rate whose share price movements had, according to Gono, the 
Bank’s governor, no relationship with economic fundamentals and actual corporate 
performance of Old Mutual itself (Gono 2008). The Rserve Bank ordered the 
Zimbabwe Stock Exchange to close down and this led to the death of the local 
currency and dollarization of the economy. By January 2009 inflation had fallen to -
2.3% and was estimated at -1.0 in May 2009, according to the official inflation 
statistics (Hanke 2009). The demise of the Zimbabwean dollar also coincided with the 
political negotiations and changes that were taking place, (cf. 4.2.4). 
4.2.3 Debate regarding poor agricultural performance 
Agriculture, which, like other sectors, has been experiencing negative growth 
throughout the crisis period (see Figure 3), has been subject to debate, especially 
regarding the consequences following the implementatio  of the Fast Track Land 
Reform Programme (FTLRP) and how a way forward can be forged. Land seized 
from white farmers in a highly politicized and controversial environment, was sub-
divided into numerous small-scale farms (up to about 6 hectares in size) occupied by 
A1 model farmers and larger-scale farms occupied by A2 model farmers. Researchers 
show concern about agricultural productivity, which continued to decline despite the 
volumes of concessionary loans ushered to the new farmers.  
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While they generally agree that there was need for land reform in Zimbabwe, 
researchers tend to differ regarding the FTLRP and how it was implemented. Ndlela 
and Robinson (2007) argued that had President Robert Mugabe accepted and 
implemented a land reform programme proposed earlier on in 1998 at a meeting that 
brought together wide cross-section stakeholders, the land reform programme could 
have taken a better route than it did.  
However, Moyo and Yeros (2009) argued that the FTLRP managed to overcome the 
dualism that had characterised the agricultural system and that research showed that 
about 70% of the acquired land directly benefited 140 000 poor households mainly 
from rural areas and some from urban areas. The rest benefited about 18 000 new 
small- to medium-scale capitalists with an average of 100 hectares, while the 
remaining large scale farms have been down-sized from an average of 2 000 hectares 
to an average of 700 hectares. In a different study, Scoones (2008) argued, from his 
research in the Masvingo Province, that some of the A1 farmers demonstrated great 
potential because of what they managed to achieve despite little credit and 
hyperinflation.  
In critique of some terms of reference issued by the World Bank on Zimbabwe, 
Moyo, Scoones and Cousins (2009) pointed out that i was incorrect for the Bank to 
refer to the time before the FTLRP as the golden era of agriculture in Zimbabwe. 
They argued that the beef industry was constantly working at a loss and food was 
sometimes imported into the country. Regarding the land issue in Zimbabwe, the 
authors suggested a forward-looking approach but underli ed the fact that the reform 
marked the end of extreme dualism in the country’s agricultural sector. 
During the period of macroeconomic instability, credit for farmers never went well. 
While the Government-driven land reform programme was understood to have given 
birth to a new breed of farmers, financial institutions perceived them as too risky to 
extend financial services. Commercial banks gradually withdrew their outreach in 
rural areas citing several challenges such as lack of ollateral in the absence of legal 
title to land (RBZ 2007). Meanwhile, AFC had been privatised in 1999 and operated 
as Agribank and farmers had remained without any committed financier. In 
realization of this gap, Government repossessed Agribank and converted it into an 
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agricultural development bank to fund agriculture, especially the new farmers. 
However, Agribank faced viability constrains due to lack of capitalization and a 
consideration of it entering into partnership with development-oriented private 
organization was suggested as way forward (Malaba 2008).  
In their assessment of various financial services extended by Government for the 
agricultural sector, Mukwereza and Manzungu (2003) noted that Government was 
involved in too many types of financial activities and this compromised its 
effectiveness. They also observed that Government put too much focus on short-term 
loans while it neglected infrastructural development. In addition, it did not interrogate 
enough why private sector was not providing short-term loans. The authors also 
observed that poor institutional capacity was the greatest threat to the sustainability of 
the financing system. Some of the Government agencies that the authors studied 
showed that they operated without any framework andthen found it difficult to 
administer the funds they received from Government. One other hurdle that they 
identified regarded, not only the inadequacy of theloans, but also the delays in 
providing them. However, Mukwereza and Manzungu (2003) considered the 
stabilization of the economy as paramount for the revival of the agricultural sector.  
Using econometrical methods to evaluate the impact of credit availability on 
communal and commercial sector maize output in Zimbabwe, Musuna and 
Muchapondwa (2008) found out that communal sector maize production did not 
respond to credit incentives. For the authors, the findings imply that an increase in 
concessionary provision of credit that started in 2004 did not make any difference. In 
addition, the study also revealed that communal sector maize output was not affected 
by the area under cultivation. This implied that adding more land to the sector would 
not bring any increased production. The evaluation showed that the sector responded 
to rainfall and hence: investment in the construction of dams and supplementary 
irrigation would be important to make the communal areas more productive. Since the 
commercial agricultural sector proved to positively respond to credit availability, 
more investment should be made in this sector in order to improve agricultural 
productivity.  
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4.2.4 Signs of recovery, a beginning of a new era? 
The forming of the Government of National Unity through the September 15, 2008 
Global Political Agreement (following hotly contestd March 2008 parliamentary and 
presidential elections in which many lives were lost due to political violence) resulted 
in Zimbabwe adopting policies that have helped the economy to show some signs of 
recovery. However, whether this marked the beginning of the end of the crisis era 
may be too early to tell.  The new but fragile Government of National Unity has since 
started taking measures to stabilise the economy by ending the Quasi-fiscal activities 
of the central bank and introducing dollarization through a multicurrency system. In 
May 2009, Zimbabwe had a monthly inflation rate as low as -1.0% and in June it rose 
to 0.6% (The Zimbabwe Independent, 23 July 2009). It also removed unsustainable 
price controls, initiated cash budgeting and reopened the stock market. The Unity 
Government also authored a recovery document entitld Short Term Emergency 
Recovery Programme (STERP), which reinforced support f  equitable land 
redistribution and the importance of food security and self reliance (Lee 2009). 
However, Robertson (The Zimbabwe Times, 1, April 2009) observed that instead of 
restoring the collateral value of its land in order to get credit for its own recovery, 
Zimbabwe, as reflected in STERP, was only focusing o  mobilizing external funding 
amounting to US8.4 billion to bankroll the recovery. Whether this can be said to be 
the start of a new era for the Zimbabwean economy, ti e will tell.  
While the aim of this chapter has been to provide the background to agricultural credit 
in Zimbabwe as well as describe the context in which this research was carried out, 
the following chapter presents the main findings. 
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5  Findings - Perspective of Stakeholders 
Findings revealed that some of the problems regarding agricultural credit in 
Zimbabwe were not necessarily related to hyperinflation. Government loans and 
inputs schemes took too long to be disbursed, a problem which existed even before 
hyperinflation. Repayment favoured the borrower since inflation eroded the value of 
the loans borrowed at fixed interest rates. There was high shortage of inputs as local 
producers did not find their business viable due to price control of agricultural 
products. In addition, a shortage of foreign currency i  the country made it difficult to 
import the shortfall. Most institutions approached in the research could not fulfil their 
mandates due to the harsh economic environment.  
5.1 Profiles and operations of stakeholders 
The range of respondents belonged to various agricultural stakeholders whose 
operations are critical to the success of agriculture in the country. They included 
finance, commodity and inputs supplier institutions a d a farmers’ organization. 
5.1.1 Financial Institutions 
Agricultural Development Bank of Zimbabwe (Agribank) 
Agribank started operating as private commercial bank fter inheriting AFC assets 
and liabilities in 1999, following Government’s failure to fund AFC’s operations. The 
then new bank invested in improving the technology f the broad network of branches 
it inherited from AFC so as to provide competitive banking services to farmers, its 
intended customers. However, it lacked skills to compete with established commercial 
banks and could not, therefore, manage to mobilise ad quate deposits to run its 
operations. In October 2003, Government reclaimed ownership of Agribank and 
though the latter continued trading with the same name, its official name became the 
Agricultural Development Bank of Zimbabwe. Agribank continued operating as a 
commercial bank but with a specific responsibility for agricultural development. Its 
mandate entailed funding agriculture in all short, medium and long-term facets. It 
meant mobilising deposits and creating partnerships with private and public sectors 
for the development of agriculture. There was a speculation that the bank would 
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develop a fresh crop of viable and sustainable indigenous commercial farmers, most 
of whom had benefited from the FTLRP (D, 12/08). 
Part of the reason that AFC converted into a commercial bank was that Government 
was finding it difficult to fund this institution. The same problem resurfaced after 
2003, when the bank had, once again, become state-own d. Agricultural development 
activities are carried out at a subsidised rate of interest and anything outside the 
market has to be funded by someone other than the institution itself. The deposits that 
the institution mobilised could not fund agriculture because they were at a higher cost 
than farmers were willing to take. Since 2003, funding was basically provided by the 
Reserve Bank through its Quasi-fiscal activities (D, 12/08).  
ZB Bank  
ZB Bank, which used to be known as Zimbank, is one f the two commercial banks 
that the researcher approached. It is 100% owned by ZB Financial Holdings, a 
holding company of a group of companies that provide commercial and merchant 
banking and other financial services. ZB bank has an agribusiness unit meant to 
provide the agricultural sector with certain financial services such as infrastructural 
developments, working capital, capital expenditure and Agricultural Sector 
Productivity Enhancement Facility (ASPEF) facilities. In 2008, ZB Bank and 
Agribank were included in the list of institutions that were put under sanctions by the 
United States (US) Government. These sanctions prohibit U.S. persons from 
conducting financial or commercial transactions with these banks and other listed 
entities. When ZB was listed under sanctions, most of its clients withdrew their 
accounts and this reduced the deposits. It mainly relied on ASPEF funds from the 
RBZ. However, the shift to the use of foreign currency meant that ZB Bank could no 
longer receive concessionary loans from the central bank, leaving it with little to lend 
farmers (F, 02/06/09).  
Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe (CBZ) 
The Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe’s Agribusiness Unit, whose headquarters is 
located at Westgate in Harare, is the second bank the researcher sourced information 
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from. The bank was once known as the Bank of Credit and Commerce or Dual Bank 
until the mid 1990s when it diversified lending into all sectors of the economy, one of 
which was the Agribusiness Unit. This unit consists of 20 staff members, 18 of which 
are housed at Westgate in Harare and the remaining two are each posted in Chinhoyi 
and Karoi, the busiest agricultural centres (G, 03/06/09). 
5.1.2 Government Commodity and other Support Service Insti utions 
Grain Marketing Board and the Tobacco Industry and Marketing Board 
During the period of hyperinflation, Government-owned commodity institutions such 
as the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) and the Tobacco Industry and Marketing Board 
(TIMB) also ran Government supported farming inputs schemes. These parastatals 
distributed fertilisers, seeds and chemicals while Agribank catered for the cash loans. 
Loan repayment by the farmers were expected after th  harvests (H, 04/06/09; J, 
08/06/09).  
Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) 
The Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) is a parastatal whose 
mandate is to produce for the nation. It is there to make sure that the nation has food 
self-sufficiency in terms of grains and livestock products. In addition, it supports 
smallholder farmers by providing them with technical extension assistance and 
helping them to identify sources of finance from donors. It also runs donor-funded 
dairy development programmes for the smallholder farmers. The institution offers 
tillage, planting and marketing services to farmers settled in the surrounding areas of 
its estates. ARDA also assists farmers that are organised in groups to prepare 
bankable project proposals for financing so that they can access assistance from 
Agribank and seed companies (N, 08/06/09).  
Agricultural, Rural and Technical Extension services (AGRITEX) 
The Agricultural, Rural and Technical Services (AGRITEX) is a department in the 
Ministry of Agriculture whose core function is to offer extension services to farmers 
through training. Its structures include a head office in Harare, provincial and district 
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offices and frontline staff or extension workers in the communal and resettlement 
areas. The majority of the farmers they assist are communal, A1 and A2 farmers. 
AGRITEX trains the farmers in the use of farming technology and it also advises 
them on how and where to get credit (Q, 09/06/09).  
5.1.3 Inputs Supplier Institutions 
Seed companies: Pannar and SeedCo 
Pannar Seed, is a company providing seed production, research, development and 
marketing. It is located in Ruwa, about 20km east of Harare. Pannar operates 
internationally and its headquarters are in Greytown, South Africa. Maize seed is its 
main product but it also produces sunflower, sorghum, soya beans and sugarcane 
seeds, amongst others. Pannar Seed sells its products to the farming community of 
Zimbabwe through national customers that are spread across the country. It contracts 
commercial farmers to produce the seeds for the farming community in general (K, 
10/06/09).  
Seed Co-operative Company of Zimbabwe (SeedCo) is located in Harare and has a 
long history of producing seeds dating back to the 1940s and 1950s. This seed 
company is a leader in the sector and is now found in other African countries. It is 
self-financed and produces maize and other grain seeds for the country and other 
countries in the region. SeedCo contracts commercial farmers from Mashonaland 
West region to grow seeds. Like the Pannar Seed Company, SeedCo provides farmers 
with fertilisers, chemicals and foundation seeds and then deducts its inputs costs when 
farmers sell their produce. For distribution within the country, SeedCo has depots 
spread out across the country. They are found in Bulawayo, Gweru, Masvingo, 
Mutare, Rusape, Bindura, Karoi, Chegutu and Chipinge. These distribution points sell 
the seeds to wholesalers who, in turn, sell them to retailers. The seed is delivered to 
these depots for free in order to maintain a low cost of the seed product (L, 15/06/09). 
Windmill Private Company 
Windmill is a private fertiliser company that started in 1947. Its core business is to 
manufacture and distribute fertilisers and to formulate and distribute chemicals. The 
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private company, whose head offices and two plants are based in Harare, also 
produces products for animal health and livestock. Cereal, tobacco, cotton, soya 
beans, tea and potato fertilisers are some of Windmill’s products. In addition, it 
distributes Ammonium Nitrate, Calcium Ammonium Nitrate and Urea. Windmill has 
its own network of stockists across the country for distributing its products to farmers. 
There are also traders who buy for resale and farmers that buy directly from 
Windmill. The GMB depots, Farm and City and Red Star all of which have branch 
networks are some of the outlets for Windmill products. The company has a tradition 
of availing credit facilities for their products to farmers who meet their criteria. 
However, during hyperinflation, it availed no credit facilities and resorted to strict 
cash transactions (M, 23/06/09). 
5.1.4 Farmers 
The Zimbabwe Farmers’ Union (ZFU) comprises of farme s from all groups in 
Zimbabwe, namely, large and small commercial, A2, A1 communal and resettlement 
farmers. However, most of the members of the union are from communal areas. The 
union is structured according to levels ranging from national, provincial, district, area 
to ward levels. The mission of the Zimbabwe Farmers’ Union is to promote and 
advance farmers’ interests and welfare. It does this through representation, 
networking, information dissemination, capacity building, formation of commercially 
viable enterprises and mobilisation of resources and members. Other services 
provided by the union include lobbying Government for conducive agricultural 
policies and negotiating on behalf of farmers for better producer and input prices (R, 
03/06/09).  
A few A1 farmers (three male and two females) who participated in this research by 
way of group interview were from Macheke area. These were allocated a farm that 
used to belong to a white commercial farmer. However, the interview was carried out 
in Harare at tobacco auction floors where the farmers had come to market their 
tobacco produce. An A2 farmer who was a key informant in this research runs a farm 
in Bindura but works in Harare for one of the agricultural parastatals presented above. 
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5.2 Emerging Issues 
5.2.1 Small and large farmers important for increased productivity 
The research sought to find out which, among the various groups of farmers did the 
respondents consider as most important in the sector and what assistance would they 
need. Respondents generally agreed that both smallholder (Communal, Resettlement 
and A1) and large (commercial and A2) farmers were all important for increasing 
agricultural productivity in the country and hence should all be extended appropriate 
support. While the smallholder sector was noted for its immense contribution in 
ensuring food security in the past and its present potential, commercial farming was 
considered important for export purposes and forward linkages. However, 
respondents emphasised the need for giving financial support to the often-forgotten 
smallholder farmers. According to one respondent (N, 08/06/09), contribution by the 
smallholder farmers went unnoticed because their produce usually remained at 
household level and did not reflect in the GDP. He mentioned that about 70% of the 
country’s livestock was in the hands of the smallholder farmers and that was not 
usually reflected in the GDP. Even so, banks were not seen as making enough effort: 
“Mabhengi, dai akaedzawo  kuwana nzira yokubatsira m -smallholder farmers 
pane kuti varegerwe vakadaro vachinetseka vari vega”  [Banks should try to 
find ways of accommodating smallholder farmers so that hey can support them, 
instead of leaving them to struggle on their own]. (H, 04/06/09)  
In order to ensure that farmers gave their best in agriculture, some respondents 
indicated that there was need for change in policy and mentality. The economist at the 
Zimbabwe Farmers’ Union (R, 03/06/09) pointed out that besides providing inputs in 
good time and efficient extension and marketing servic s, focus should also be on a 
policy shift from extensive to intensive use of land. According to him, emphasis 
should be put on increasing, not the area under production, but productivity. An 
agronomist at Pannar (K, 10/06/09) raised the need for leaders to stop politicizing the 
agricultural sector and show more results. He regretted that some people acquired 
large farms from white farmers but were not making full use of them. The interviewee 
from Pannar also stated that the agricultural sector needed a paradigm shift whereby it 
is considered agriculture to be a legitimate business farmers could invest in. 
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According to him, Government should also help this o happen just as it helped turn 
mini-buses into a proper taxi business, replacing the Peugeot 404 in the 1980s. A key 
informant from Agribank believed that if Government i vested in infrastructure, 
improving irrigation facilities and dams, this would automatically change the mindset 
of smallholder farmers. With irrigation facilities at their disposal, smallholder farmers 
will automatically produce, not only for consumption, but also for commercial 
purposes (D, 12/08). 
5.2.2 Reduced lending activities by private credit suppliers 
The macroeconomic conditions discouraged service suppliers from availing loan 
facilities.  According to the SeedCo sales manager, hyperinflation and credit cannot 
coexist: 
Normally, offering credit means that the supplier has to find value in giving 
credit. Since inflation means [that] things are losing value, the supplier becomes 
even more exposed to loss of value. You can’t talk of credit in such 
[hyperinflationary] times since the two things [credit and hyperinflation] run 
parallel. (L, 15/06/09) 
 The Windmill fertiliser company stopped providing credit facilities to farmers during 
the period of hyperinflation and settled for cash transactions only. The company’s 
marketing manager summarised it this way: 
We stopped extending credit facilities because we op rated in an unhealthy 
macroeconomic environment.  Prices were constantly changing and banks no 
longer administered loans in a normal way. The ever-increasing high interest 
rates set by the central bank and the high exchange rates that prevailed also 
discouraged us from providing the credit facilities to our customers. (M, 
23/06/09) 
In commercial banks, reduced agricultural lending was not necessarily due to 
hyperinflationary factors but to the fact that after Government’s land reform 
programme, farm land collateral value dropped to zero. Potential borrowers in the 
rural areas could not qualify for credit since they mainly relied on the land. 
Commercial banks gradually reduced their outreach in rural areas since most of the 
new landowners did not have the alternative collateral of urban property or farm 
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equipment that the banks required (D, 12/08). That t e land lost collateral power was 
also echoed by the ZB Bank relationship manager in the Agribusiness Unit: 
Due to acquisition of farms by Government, farms were no longer a tangible 
security that banks could depend on since it would be ifficult to sell the farm in 
the event of a default. Properties in town could be sold in the event of default. 
(F, 02/06/09) 
5.2.3 Government loans 
Findings showed that Government was the main funder of agricultural loans during 
the crisis period. It engaged in various programmes such as Agricultural Sector 
Productivity Enhancement Facility (ASPEF) and inputs credit schemes. Regarding 
inputs credit schemes, parastatals such as the GMB and the TIMB received funding 
from Government, sourced farm inputs from suppliers and provided farmers with 
these inputs with the view of recovering the credit at harvest time. While ASPEF was 
targeted at large farmers, smallholder farmers were provided for through a scheme 
called the Public Sector Investment Programme.  
ASPEF was the principal mechanism for funding agriculture in the country since 
2003. This facility was provided by the Reserve Bank through its Quasi-fiscal 
activities and was accessed by all the banks (D, 12/08). For the Commercial Bank of 
Zimbabwe, 90% of its agricultural loans came from ASPEF while only 10% came 
from deposits (G, 03/06/09).  
Among those that managed to access ASPEF funds were A2 and commercial farmers, 
agro processors, seed houses and commodity companies and brokers, most of which 
had immovable property in towns that served as collateral. The large size of farms of 
A2 and commercial farmers attracted low administrative costs. Dealing with such a 
class of farmers meant less paper work to process large loans and less transport costs  
in the monitoring phases. Besides low administrative costs, the banks preferred to deal 
with A2 and commercial farmers because of the low risks involved since their 
farming methods, which included irrigation schemes, were superior to those of 
smallholder farmers that solely relied on rainfall (F, 02/06/09; G, 03/06/09).  
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At the Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe, smallholder farme s were only offered loans 
if they were into horticulture (G, 03/06/09). The only way ZB Bank dealt with 
smallholder farmers was when they joined contract grower schemes by companies, for 
instance, the Cotton Company of Zimbabwe (Cottco). These would normally 
approach the banks, acquire money, purchase inputs and then further lend them to 
smallholder farmers (F, 02/03/09). The numerous smallholder farmers were not 
extended loans by the commercial banks due to the high administrative costs and risks 
involved (F, 02/06/09; G, 03/06/09).  
Under ASPEF, there were some medium term loans for mall livestock production. 
The facility also offered other lines of credit to enable farmers to access service from 
particular service providers. Some of these included the supply of diesel from the 
National Oil Company of Zimbabwe, tillage by Agricultural and the Rural 
Development Authority (ARDA), the District Development Fund and other private 
companies that could rent out tractors. Irrigation rehabilitation and farm 
mechanisation were other available credit lines provided by the Reserve Bank. These 
were also negatively affected by hyperinflation (R, 03/06/09). 
Although ASPEF was not a development but an agricultural productivity 
enhancement fund, it ended up being used for developmental purposes. The farmers 
that had acquired land through FTLRP had no basic infrastructure for productivity. 
Big farms were divided into smaller farms and some people received parts that had no 
production infrastructure aside from their land. The ASPEF ended up serving as 
capital, not for production, but for developing the land itself. According an informant 
from Agribank, ASPEF wrongly assumed that there was productivity. “You can’t 
enhance where there is nothing” (D, 12/08).  
Since smallholder farmers were not covered by ASPEF, Government funded them 
through the Public Sector Investment Programme. Only Agribank, among all the 
banks, has access to this facility. The Public Sector Investment Programme was an old 
intervention that Government used to have with AFC. In essence it would “write a 
cheque” to the inputs supplier institution in order to fund farmers. However these did 
not benefit much from the facility since Government did not have enough money (D, 
12/08).  
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5.2.4 Delays in the dispatching of Government Loans and inputs 
In a group interview, one smallholder farmer had this o say:  
The rain season is not a family car that can wait for you to put on your shoes. It 
doesn’t wait for you to source inputs. Once it sets off, that’s it, no matter what 
(T, 23/06/09). 
Delays by Government in dispatching loans was not a new phenomenon (D, 12/08) 
but it made things worse during hyperinflation (R, 03/06/09; Q, 09/06/09). In order to 
access ASPEF funds, farmers had to file applications with the banks. The banks went 
through their own processes of assessing the viability of the projects of farmers and 
this entailed visiting the farms. The banks would then forward the applications to the 
RBZ for approval. This approval could take about three months. By the time the 
farmer received the money, it had lost value. The farmer failed to purchase the inputs 
since prices were rising on an almost hourly basis. Some of the banks received a lot of 
top-up requests from farmers who needed to meet their original needs. Nonetheless, 
the banks could not afford to raise these shortfalls (F, 02/06/09; Q, 09/06/09; R, 
03/06/09). According to the Agribank key informant, this behaviour by Government 
was not news:  
The funding problems that AFC experienced in the early 1980s still show 
themselves today after Government has, repossessed Agribank. In 2007, 
Government allocated funding for livestock at national level. The money could 
have funded the purchase of at least 1000 herd of cattle had it been dispatched 
in time. However, it could hardly fund 10 cattle by the time the money reached 
the bank. The delay in delivering the allocation by Government gave a chance 
for inflation to erode the value of the funding. (D, 12/08) 
According to the economist of the Zimbabwe Farmers’ Union, these delays affected, 
not only the farming planning, but also the national st tistics. A farmer could apply 
for support to work on 20 hectares but when the money came, it only sufficed for two 
hectares due to erosion by hyperinflation. The records of those running ASPEF 
would, for instance, show that a total of 2000 hectares were sponsored, while in 
reality, only a tenth of that figure was finally sponsored. In such a situation, farmers 
found it difficult to plan. In most cases, they scaled down their operations in order to 
match the reduced value of the loans (R, 03/06/09).  
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The Head of Planning and Business Department of ARD bemoaned the slow 
manner in which Government funds were dispatched. He said that it was no secret 
that disbursement from Government took a long time to be effected. He narrated that 
in January 2008, Government allocated ZW$1.8 trillion to the ARDA farmer 
programme of dairy development. At the time of allocation, this amount was enough 
to cover for the whole year as planned. It was intended to complete the construction of 
three smallholder rural dairies, to purchase vehicls and support the year’s operations, 
which included visiting and training of farmers. When the money was disbursed in 
March, ARDA could not even buy one vehicle using that money. Government was 
approached for supplementary budget but it had nothi g to give. According to this 
respondent, this project collapsed because of hyperinflation but was made worse due 
to delay by Government (N, 08/06/09). 
Farmer respondents complained about delays in payment, which made it impossible 
for them to purchase inputs for the seasons that followed (S, 10/03/09; T, 23/06/09). 
The GMB, as the monopoly buyer and exporter of grain, was very slow to pay the 
farmers. This negatively impacted on farmers given the high rate at which the local 
currency depreciated (R, 03/06/09). It also fuelled side-marketing as farmers avoided 
the official grain buyer and sold their produce to private buyers who never supplied 
them with inputs in the first place (T, 23/06/09). Due to its culture of delay, some 
banks hesitated giving loans that were meant to be recovered by the GMB by way of 
stop orders (G, 03/06/09). The operations manager of the GMB also confirmed that 
farmers were not happy with what they were paid by the GMB, alluding to the 
experience that by the time the money reached theirhands, inflation would have 
eroded it (J, 08/06/09). 
5.2.5 High rate of loan recovery 
Regarding the level of loan repayment, most respondents pointed out that repayment 
was not a problem during the time of hyperinflation. When it came to repayment of 
loans, the hyperinflationary conditions favoured the farmer more than the credit 
supplier since the borrowed money rapidly lost value. Due to this, there was a high 
demand for lending (F, 02/06/09; G, 03/06/09). 
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Without much hesitance, informants from the two commercial banks estimated that 
there was about 100% loan recovery rate (F, 02/06/09); G, 03/06/09).   Agribank, 
whose clients inherited from AFC were notorious fornon-repayment of loans, 
estimated a 99.99% repayment rate on ASPEF loans. The economist at the Zimbabwe 
Farmers’ Union, also a farmer, wondered whether banks were making any profit out 
of credit extension since repayment was too easy. For him, “you could easily payback 
using money from your back pocket and this was no miracle since the value of money 
changed by morning and evening” (R, 03/06/09). 
However, exceptional cases of problematic repayments occurred when there were 
poor harvests due to droughts (J, 08/06/09). In the case of some of the diary projects 
for smallholder farmers facilitated by ARDA, the farmers failed to repay because they 
could not access their cash from the banks. In other words, they had money in their 
banks but they could not withdraw it due to the limited cash withdrawals imposed by 
the central bank. Although this crisis stemmed from the banks it could still be traced 
back to hyperinflation related problems (N, 08/06/09).  
Fixed rates also helped farmers to effortlessly repay but did little to support the 
viability of credit institutions. Traditionally, bank loans are issued on compound rate. 
However, both ASPEF and the Public Sector Investmen Programme had a fixed 
interest rate of 25% per annum, even when monthly inf at on was above 300%.  This 
interest rate was much lower than the Reserve Bank’s overnight accommodation rate 
of 40 000%. Agribank, which managed the two facilities, could not grow much from 
such interest rates which were well below the hyperinflationary rate. The difference 
between 25% and 40 000% represented the bank’s capital erosion. Put differently, 
Agribank was unable to grow by a factor of 39 975%. This made the bank 
unprofitable and unsustainable, hence dependent on either Government or the Reserve 
Bank for its funding activities. The bank failed to meet the 2008 capital requirements 
of USD12.5 million for commercial banks. It also failed to pay its foreign creditors 
for the banking system (D, 12/08), even though the loan repayment rate reached 
99.99%.   
A case of an A2 farmer that the researcher interviewed shows how easy it was for the 
borrower to repay. This farmer received tobacco inputs priced at ZW$60 600.00 in 
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October 2008. While hyperinflation in the country was, at that time, estimated to have 
reached the quintillion percent mark, the farmer still managed to get inputs pegged at 
a rate as low as 11.87%. In March 2009, when the res archer interviewed the farmer, 
the farmer owed his financier only ZW$67,795.48 (see Table 1). By that time, a trip 
by a commuter taxi cost ZW$3 trillion, which was then equated to USD0.50 or R5.00. 
One could literally repay this loan at cost equivalent to that of commuter taxi fare and 
still remain with some change. 










Description Debits Credits Balance 
16/09/2008 IPO-016332 Bactac 54,000.00  54,000.00 
16/09/2008 IPO-046128 Monocrotophos 4,000.00  58,000.00 
01/10/2008 IPO-046174 Copper 
Oxychloride 
2,600.00  60,600.00 
09/03/2009 Interest  7,195.48  67,795.48 
Grower owes financier - Balance 67,795.48 
An inputs administration officer of TIMB indicated that while it was easy for the 
farmers to repay the loans, the eroded value of the repaid loans sent a bad signal for 
the season that followed:   
The one who borrows has no problem in repaying but the problem is passed on 
to us who extend the credit. We cannot restock in preparation for the next cycle 
of credit using the money that we get from the repayment. (H, 04/06/09) 
This high rate of repayment was neither an indication of improvement in terms of loan 
repayment (especially in the case of Agribank clients) or increase in productivity. It 
was only a sign of the hyperinflationary environment in the country. The farmers, 
most of whom were either civil servants or self-employed, could easily pay back the 
ASPEF loans from their salaries six or less months after borrowing. This means that 
with hyperinflation, farmers did not really need to produce in order to repay the loans. 
There was discordance between the funds ploughed into agriculture and productivity 
(D, 12/08). There were reports of farmers who diverted loans to lucrative activities 
such as parallel markets in order to source foreign currency. Such farmers could 
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manage to repay the loans barely two months after borrowing (10/03/09). As the 
informant from Agribank put it, “inflation, not productivity, took care of repayment of 
farm loans” (D, 12/08). 
5.2.6 Shortage of inputs 
One of the issues that stood out from the experience of the interviewees was the 
shortage of inputs. When farmers got money, prices w nt up. In response to that, 
Government tried to control prices. As a result, private inputs suppliers could manage 
to recover their costs. This forced them to scale down their production. Demand grew 
and some inputs ended up being sold at black market. Corruption loomed under these 
circumstances.  
While banks could have managed to provide the loans, there was a time when the 
inputs could not be found in the market (F, 02/06/09; 3/06/09). According to the 
respondents from the seeds and fertiliser institutions, hyperinflation and price control 
of their products were some of the factors that made their business unviable (K, 
10/06/09; L 15/06/09; M, 23/06/09).   
In its operations, SeedCo contracted farmers to grow its products and for that, it 
supplied the contract farmers with all the necessary inputs. They would then deduct 
the input costs when the farmers delivered the produce for sale. Government put price 
control on agricultural products, including the seed maize. Due to hyperinflation, 
SeedCo could not manage to recover the input costs. In addition, Government did not 
frequently review the controlled price of maize seed so that it matched the rate at 
which inflation rose. According to the SeedCo sales manager, the cost recovery was 
almost zero. This made it difficult for the company to source new inputs for the 
seasons that followed. The money it got from the farmers’ repayments could not 
suffice to purchase foreign currency which it needed for importing some of the inputs 
(L 15/06/09).  
The controlled and uncompetitive seed price fuelled breaching of contract between 
SeedCo and the seed growers as the latter diverted th  produce to commodity 
suppliers of mealie-meal who offered competitive prices (L 15/06/09). The experience 
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by SeedCo is echoed by other private inputs suppliers. An agronomist at Pannar Seed 
Company believed that the biggest constrain in thissector was that Government 
controlled the price of the maize seed and yet other inputs such as fuel needed to 
produce the seed remained uncontrolled. In this way, seed production became an 
unprofitable enterprise because inputs costs could not be recovered and the seed 
company reduced its production. While Government put the national seed 
requirement at about 40 000 tonnes, only about 12 000 tonnes were produced by all 
seed houses in the country in 2008. The shortfall ws augmented through imports.  
The agronomist acknowledged that other factors such as drought and the 
underutilization of farms acquired under FTLRP could a so have contributed to the 
shortage of the seed product (K, 10/06/09).  Before hyperinflation, Windmill used to 
push about 280 000 tonnes of fertiliser into the market. In the time of hyperinflation, 
this figure dropped down to an average of 35 000. Like SeedCo, due to lack of foreign 
currency Windmill could not afford importing some of the raw material and finished 
products it needed. According to the Windmill sales manager, while Government tried 
to supply inputs it also crowded out Windmill stockists (M, 23/06/09). 
The Government-owned ARDA had to battle with shortages of fuel and spare parts 
for tractors it hired out to till for smallholder farmers.  Affordable fuel was in short 
supply and unaffordable fuel could be sourced from the black market. The head of a 
department of ARDA said that in most cases, they “had to rely nemakorokoza [on 
black market] in order to make ends meet” (N, 08/06/09).  
Since supply of inputs was low, demand became high and the few but available inputs 
were, in some occasions, sold at black market. Such an environment led to a lot of 
irregularities and corrupt practices. Smallholder fa mers who participated in the 
research indicated that they endured a lot from this anomaly. Some were unfortunate 
to have spent fortunes on ‘maize seed’ from the black market, only to realise at the 
time of planting that it was fake (S, 10/03/09). According to the group of A1 farmers, 
political affiliation also mattered: 
The distribution of Government inputs in our resettlement area was very much 
politicised. Kwedu mbeu yanga ichitori nyaya yezvenyika. Waitofanira 
kuratidza kuti uri wemusangano kuti uwane chisamba chembeu. [You had to be 
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a member of the ruling party for you to be able to get a pocket of maize seed]. 
(T, 23/06/09) 
Those who had money and good connections with big chefs [political leaders] 
swept away all the inputs in the market at cheap prices and then them sold to us 
on the black market at very high prices. (T, 23/06/09) 
 At one time, I bought bags of fertiliser from the black market at triple the 
official price, only to lose them to the police when I failed to produce a 
purchase receipt.] (T, 23/06/09)  
5.2.7 Coping strategies 
According the fieldwork responses, institutions used various methods to militate 
against hyperinflation. In order to reduce loss of value of inputs, SeedCo introduced 
an inflation-fighting scheme which ensured that it got valuable repayment while 
farmers also got a form of capital for their operations. It did this by advancing inputs 
to the farmer but converted the value of the inputs into seed equivalent units. 
However, this strategy had legal complications since it naturally invited the use of 
foreign currency in determining the equivalent unit (L, 15/06/09).  The Commercial 
Bank of Zimbabwe introduced a global facility whereby it allowed its farmer-clients 
to overdraw their accounts so that they could speedily secure farming inputs, reducing 
the delay by the RBZ (G, 03/06/09). Both commercial b nks reduced the lending 
periods for the working capital so that they coincided with the production cycle, 
which would vary from one to four months, depending on the product in question. 
This helped them to recover the loans before they had lost much value (F, 02/06/09; 
G, 03/06/09). According to the informant from Zimbabwe Farmers Union, farmers 
could have opted for projects such as poultry, which offered quick returns (R, 
03/06/09). For the administration officer at Tobacco Industry and Marketing Board, it 
was high time that black farmers learnt something from the practice of the white 
commercial farmers and bought their inputs well in advance (H, 04/06/09).  
Even though Government only introduced the use of foreign currency towards the end 
of 2008, some respondents claimed that, despite the illegality, the use of foreign 
currency in local transactions started long before. By dollarization, Government was 
only legalizing what was already a common practice in the society, for “Government 
systems are always slower than the people on the ground” (N, 08/06/09).  
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5.2.8 Ineffectiveness of stakeholders 
Most of the respondents held the view that their various institutions could not manage 
to fulfil their mandates during the time of hyperinflation.  As a development bank, 
Agribank failed to fulfil its development mandate as Government continually failed to 
capitalise it. This implies that the majority of farmers remained without support (D, 
08/12). Due to hyperinflation and inadequate capitalization from Government, ARDA 
failed to achieve its goal of ensuring adequate food security in the country. It failed to 
effectively engage in commercial agricultural production and supporting of rural 
development: 
We failed the nation. In a nutshell, we, as an arm of Government and 
Government itself included, failed the nation. Had we not, then we would not 
have been importing food from South Africa. (N, 08/06/09) 
Besides hyperinflation, the operations manager of the GMB blamed it on climatic 
conditions: “We were not able to meet our targets as there was drought” (J, 08/06/09). 
A close look at the findings also shows that the problem of agricultural credit in 
Zimbabwe has symptoms that go beyond hyperinflationry causes. The problem of 
delays by Government institutions, for instance, was there before hyperinflation. That 
financial institutions were reluctant to extend credit to new farmers was not 
necessarily due to hyperinflation. Instead, it had mainly to do with how the issue of 
land reform was handled. In other words, the problem r garding agricultural credit in 
Zimbabwe existed before hyperinflation and awaits Zimbabwe even after the 
stabilisation of the economy. 
  




6 Analysis - Future of agricultural credit in Zimbabw e 
The discussion emerging out of this research can be likened to a football game which 
needs, not only a good turf on the playing field an good rules regulated by referees, 
but also well-trained players. While the playing field, the game rules and referees all 
represent the macroeconomic environment, the credit inst utions and the farmers are 
the players of the game. A bad game can be due to a po r playing field, bad refereeing 
or incompetent players. In the case of Zimbabwe, both the macroeconomic 
environment (playing field) and the credit institutions (players) need improvement. 
This claim is made on the basis of insights from the literature reviewed and findings 
in this research.  
Results from fieldwork indicated that operations of key stakeholders in the 
agricultural sector were ineffective under hyperinflationary conditions. This calls for 
political leaders to demonstrate commitment to improve the economic situation in the 
country. It entails elimination of hyperinflation and creation of conditions that 
encourage extension of financial services to the poor in rural areas. Since the history 
of agricultural credit shows that there was a culture of non-repayment and a general 
reluctance to extend credit to the poor, it is necessary to shift mentality on the part of 
both the borrower and the supplier in order to make credit accessible to the poor in a 
sustainable way. This, in turn, calls for the need for development of financial 
institutions.  
6.1 Stable macroeconomic environment for better financial services  
The findings showed that regardless of effort, the key stakeholders in agriculture 
approached during this study were not effective dueto the harsh macroeconomic 
environment characterised by hyperinflation (see 5.2.8)   Literature on the 
development of financial institutions (see 2.3) suggests that a stable macroeconomic 
and socio-political environment is important for the smooth operation of financial 
institutions. According to Yaron and Benjamin (2002), it is the duty of government to 
see that such an environment is created since the lack of it creates uncertainty and 
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reduces the expected returns to credit suppliers (see 2.3.3). In this regard, 
hyperinflation, the number one enemy of macroeconomic stability in Zimbabwe, 
needs to be eliminated first before one can talk of any other aspect that reinforces 
macroeconomic stability and the extension of agricultural credit.  
6.1.1 Hyperinflation 
For a country that is experiencing hyperinflation, the challenges encountered 
regarding the demand and supply of credit in Zimbabwe are not surprising since they 
mirror the main characteristics of hyperinflation discussed in Chapter Two (see 2.4.1). 
That the money printed by the central bank rapidly lost value and people ended up 
using foreign currency whenever possible even thoug it was considered illegal (see 
5.2.7) was a clear sign of hyperinflation. While hyperinflation is also characterised by 
a decrease in physical production (Solimano 1990), Government’s resort to control 
prices of agricultural products without constantly reviewing them according to the 
rising inflation also exacerbated the shortage of inputs and fuelled corruption as some 
suppliers avoided the formal market and sold their products on the black market (see 
5.2.6). The high rate of repayment of the heavily subsidised loans was very 
misleading since it was not necessarily related to high productivity but to 
hyperinflation (see 5.2.5). That hyperinflation negatively affected national statistics 
because the loans issued could not meet the needs for which they were intended due 
to the fast erosion of their value is also valid because productivity never increased 
despite the subsidies. The coping strategies that sakeholders in this research adopted 
neither removed hyperinflation nor brought about overall success in the agricultural 
sector (see 5.2.7). As the adjective clearly portrays, these were only strategies for 
coping with and not eliminating the hyperinflation. The duty to cure the 
hyperinflationary environment, which economists say has to do with discipline in 
both fiscal and monetary policies (see 2.4.1), ultima ely lies with government.  
Findings in this research also establish some similarities with experiences regarding 
the political economy of agricultural credit discussed in the literature review. In some 
cases farmers had to demonstrate their party affiliation in order to access loans or 
input (see 5.2.6). This indicated a degree of politicization and patronage. Ladman and 
Tinnermeier (1981) referred to this when they argued that agricultural loans for 
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economic development can be used for political purposes and that these loans are 
increased when there is inflation (see 2.4.2). This also led to corruption as some 
Government officials (chefs) diverted the subsidies to themselves (see 5.2.6). In line 
with the theoretical framework of Ladman and Tinnerm ier, this was inevitable 
because an environment of cheap loans is conducive for grooming corruption (see 
2.4.2). Using subsidies for seeking patronage, a chracteristic of a populist 
government, was not a new thing for the ZANU (PF) Government. As discussed 
earlier on, in the 1980s Government concentrated on run ing subsidised programmes 
(in sectors of education, health and agriculture) but sidelined the more challenging 
structural changes such as land reform. The subsidy programmes were economically 
unsustainable (see 4.1.2). According to Sachs (1989) (see 2.4.2), such programmes of 
populist governments are short-lived – they bloom for a while and then blow up 
because they are not sustainable. Referring to Zimbabwe, Jenkins (1997) argued that 
credit to the rural farmers in the 1980s was enough to win votes for the populist 
ZANU (PF) Government, without the need of changing the structures that determined 
rural poverty. That some farmers had to demonstrate loyalty to the ruling party in 
order to benefit under some of the Government input credit schemes says volumes 
about how loans and inputs might have been used for political patronage.  
As discussed already, the hyperinflation has decreased since the Government of 
National Unity came to power (see 4.2.4). Stabilization measures in line with the 
traditional measures of curing hyperinflation (see 2.4.1 and 4.2.2), namely through 
commitment to fiscal and monetary discipline, are still being employed.  By adopting 
the use of a multicurrency system it meant that the central bank stopped printing 
money to fund its Quasi-fiscal activities that fuelled hyperinflation. Though the 
respondents in this research tended to consider hyperinflation as a thing of the past,  
the definition of hyperinflation by Cagan (1956, cited in Siklos 2000) only considers 
hyperinflation to end when it is less than 50% in every month during at least one year 
(see 2.4.1). By this definition, Zimbabwe is still experiencing hyperinflation. 
Nonetheless, that people already speak of hyperinflation as a thing of the past 
indicates a thread of confidence in the economy.  
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6.1.2 Land tenure and credit rights protection 
A recurrent issue raised by the respondents was that banks were hesitant to give loans 
to the farmers who acquired land through the recent land reform programmes because 
most of these farmers did not have any collateral security (see 5.2.2). Though this 
happened when Zimbabwe was already in the period of a deepening economic crisis, 
it had not yet experienced hyperinflation. According to Townsend (1979), it is only 
when there are appropriate mechanisms to enforce the repayment of loans by seizing 
collateral that banks can be confident to give loans (see 2.4.2). Given this position, the 
behaviour of the financial institutions in Zimbabwe after the land reform was, 
therefore, not unusual.  In their study, Dehesa t l. (2007) showed that in the absence 
of clear credit rights protection and low inflation, banks are unwilling to give credit 
(see 2.4.2). Since Zimbabwe has so far managed to contain the hyperinflation, it 
continues to struggle to develop land tenure laws that encourage banks to go into 
credit business with farmers. It does not really matter whether they are land title deeds 
or leases but that the type of tenure adopted is respected and enforced. The incident of 
the governor of the central bank stealing money from accounts of individuals and 
private organizations (see 4.2.1) and is not even questioned by police speaks volumes 
about how unsuitable the environment has become for the proper functioning of 
financial institutions. The elements of a conducive macroeconomic environment for 
the financial institutions discussed in Chapter Two (see 2.3.3) also apply to 
Zimbabwe: deregulated interest rates; exchange rates and agricultural policies; legal 
system that protects property rights and land-use rights; autonomy of financial 
institutions and regulatory authorities and due lega  process. 
6.1.3 Improving rural infrastructure 
While findings from this research show that both smallholder and large farmers 
should be given appropriate opportunities to increase gricultural productivity (5.2.1), 
the infrastructure in the communal and resettlement areas where smallholder farmers 
live is very poor. The history of the agricultural sector of Zimbabwe is characterised 
by dualism whereby formerly white-owned large commercial farm areas were more 
developed than communal areas. The large commercial farmers had access to the rail, 
roads and irrigation facilities (4.1.1). These facilities made it easier for the white 
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farmers to go into commercial agriculture. The communal areas continue to establish 
a great contrast. They basically have no infrastructu e and this makes it difficult for 
them to access normal services. They are poorly communicated since most areas do 
not have proper roads. Some of the areas receive poor rainfall and yet there are neither 
irrigation facilities nor dams. The lack of infrastructure discourages financial 
institutions from investing in such areas. This dualism was not by accident but design 
and has generally remained like that to date. Elimination of dualistic structures in the 
agricultural sector does not only mean land redistribution, but also developing 
communal lands by building roads, bridges, dams, irrigation facilities etc. As one of 
the informants in this research put it, if Governmet invested in infrastructure by 
improving irrigation facilities and dams, this would automatically change the mindset 
of smallholder farmers. With irrigation facilities available, smallholder farmers will 
produce for both consumption and commercial purposes (see 5.2.1). When the 
smallholder farmers turn commercial, there may be no need to convince private 
commercial banks that there is business in the communal areas since most of the risks 
regarding agriculture (e.g. lack of roads and poor rainfall) would have been reduced. 
Hence: the best way for Government to convince banks to extend financial services to 
the smallholder farmers in the rural areas is by improving the rural infrastructure.  
It is only when rural infrastructure is developed and banks made available that one 
can speak of the ‘economic opportunity for the poor’ referred to by Semboja (2004) 
(see 2.3.2).  In his findings in Kenya and Tanzania, Semboja (2004) showed that it 
was the infusion of credit into an atmosphere of economic opportunity that creates 
income, potential and prosperity otherwise no amount f credit can help the poor to 
find their way out of poverty. The implication is that given the poor infrastructure 
under which the smallholder farmers operate, instead of prioritizing private credit, 
which may not reach all the intended smallholder farmers, Government should invest 
in building rural infrastructure if it wants to promote agricultural development on 
long-term basis. After carrying out an econometric evaluation of maize smallholder 
farmers in Zimbabwe, Musuna and Muchapondwa (2008) recommended construction 
of dams in the rural areas since their findings showed that availing subsidised credit 
did not increase productivity and that it was rainfll that mattered (see 4.2.3). 
International evidence indicates that returns to private inputs subsidies are usually 
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lower than returns to investments in public goods. With this in mind Haggblade 
(2007) argued that investment in public goods such as agricultural research and 
extension, rural roads and irrigation is better than in input subsidies, which tend to 
encourage rent-seeking behaviour. The desire by respondents that all smallholder 
farmers should be supported may never be realised until the structures in which these 
farmers operate are not improved. It falls under th mandate of Government to see to 
the improvement of the macroeconomic environment in order to encourage extension 
of financial services to the rural areas.  
6.2 Need for development of institutions 
Just as a good turf on a football field and professional refereeing does not produce 
good football without good players, and so it is in the credit business - a stable 
macroeconomic environment, with low inflation, good and well-respected market 
rules and improved rural infrastructure does not do the trick without competent 
players. The players in this case, are the credit institutions and the farmers. Some of 
the problems experienced in the extension of loans that surfaced during the peak of 
hyperinflation were indications of an already faulty system that needed restructuring. 
In this way, hyperinflation only made these problems ore evident than they were 
before. However, a crisis (see 1.3) can serve as an opportunity to provide permanent 
remedy to the identified problems in the institutions. Some of the challenges 
discussed in the previous chapter go beyond problems related to hyperinflation. It 
then becomes relevant to consider the development of (both public and private) 
financial institutions, a concept discussed at length in Chapter Two (see 2.3).  
6.2.1 Building institutional capacity 
Institutional capacity is one of the aspects that need to be looked into, especially 
regarding public financial institutions and other public agencies that provide credit 
facilities to farmers. Negative effects caused by the delays in the dispatching of 
concessionary loans from the RBZ might not have been f lt much before 
hyperinflation. However, these negative effects were magnified during hyperinflation. 
Farmers failed to meet their budgets due to fast erosion of the money. That, for 
instance, a sum of money that could have purchased t least 1000 herd of cattle in 
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2007 ended up failing to buy 10 herd of cattle by the time it reached Agribank (5.2.4) 
was unfortunate. Nonetheless, it demonstrated how high t e cost of these delays was 
under hyperinflation. In cases such as that of delays in payment by GMB, farmers 
ended up receiving money that could hardly help them to buy anything for the seasons 
that followed. The elimination of hyperinflation does not automatically solve the 
problem of credit extension since the problem of delays would still remain. This is 
because it is some internal factor which incapacitates the concerned Government 
institutions. The delays are only a tip of the iceberg. The lack of competent staff, 
shortage of staff, poor technology and lack of motivation due to poor incentives are 
some of the factors that negatively affect the performance of public institutions. The 
problem of lack of institutional capacity of Government agencies was also highlighted 
by Mukwereza and Manzungu (2003). These authors pointed out that because they 
did not have any operational framework, some Governm nt agencies they studied 
found it difficult to facilitate the distribution of Government subsidies to farmers (see 
4.2.3). Agribank also lacked the skills to compete with established commercial banks 
in winning farmer-clients even though it had improved the technology of its broad 
network of branches it inherited from AFC. Developing the institutional capacity of 
the concerned public institutions is critical if these institutions have to be effective 
players in ensuring efficient financial services to the farmers.  
6.2.2 Building a culture of loan repayment 
While hyperinflation highlighted the problem of delays in public institutions, it 
concealed the old problem of non-repayment, due to the deceiving record of 100% 
rate of loan repayment. As revealed in the findings, the loans had fixed and low 
interest rates which were not revised according to the rise of hyperinflation and they 
were to be paid at the end of the season. A rapid loss of value of the loans due to 
hyperinflation made it easy for the borrower to repay. However, that repayment only 
represented monetary figures but not productivity. History shows that smallholder 
farmers had a poor record of loan repayment with AFC and Agribank. It could be 
argued that the culture of non-repayment would still exist regardless of hyperinflation. 
It, therefore, needs attention. The misconception that loan subsidies are like social 
transfers that do not need to be repaid needs to bec rr cted. The tendency to consider 
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Government subsidies as nobody’s money (imari ye hurumende, haina munhu [S, 
10/03/09]) encourages neither the borrower to repay nor the public lending institution 
to follow-up in the event of default. Suggesting innovation through group approaches 
may be like trying to reinvent the wheel. Research shows that these types of 
approaches generally do not work since farmers lack necessary homogeneity 
characteristics (see 2.3.2) and they never really worked for Zimbabwe (Bond 1998). 
However, the success story of Cottco, which was givin  credit facilities to 
smallholder cotton growers and had a record of 98% rate of repayment in 1999 needs 
to be closely examined for best practice purposes.  
6.2.3 Partnership with private sector 
Another problem related to public institutions, notably Agribank, was the lack of 
capitalization. Government had no money to fund Agribank and the latter could not 
manage to mobilise enough deposits to sustain its operations. It was due to the need to 
supply credit that AFC was created but it was due to the lack of capitalization that it 
was privatised and became Agribank. The vicious circle continued because the 
Agribank, as private bank, could not supply credit to the poor and the Government 
repossessed it in order to ensure credit supply. History repeated itself as Government 
lacked capital. Entering partnership with organizations that prioritise development 
goals is one way that Agribank can solve its problem of lack of capital. Malaba 
(2008), the Bank’s executive manager argues for such Public-Private-Partnership.  In 
addition, this can also reduce the problem of political interference, which is typically 
experienced by many parastatals (see 2.2.2). Literatur  shows that there are cases such 
as that of the Banrural Bank of Guatemala whereby Public-Private-Partnerships have 
worked well in extending credit to the poor (see 2.3.4). The agricultural policies of 
both Kenya and Senegal referred to by Anseeuw (2010, cited in Padayachee 2010 
[forthcoming]) also consider it important for state institutions to make partnership 
with the private sector (see 2.1.4). 
The concept of institutional innovation of financial institutions with the aim of 
improving their efficiency regarding sustainability, outreach and quality of their 
services to the rural poor discussed in the literature review (see 2.3) is also important 
in Zimbabwe. Respondents from all the stakeholders approached in this study 
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indicated that it was critical to extent credit facilities to smallholder farmers since they 
possess the potential to ensure food security and provide other cash crops such as 
cotton. As pointed out by one informant, banks should try to find ways of 
accommodating and supporting smallholder farmers instead of leaving them to 
struggle on their own (5.2.1). Under favourable macroe onomic conditions achieved 
through the measures discussed above (see 6.1) and given that they have also invested 
in rural areas, both private and public banks are challenged to find ways of 
penetrating their rural clients. This may involve id ntifying hidden opportunities (e.g. 
use of cattle as collateral) and eliminating barriers ( .g. language or gender related) of 
accessing financial services by rural people and yet they may have great potential of 
being bankable (see 2.3.2).  
6.3 Political will 
The future of agricultural credit in Zimbabwe also lies in the political will of its 
leaders. The profiles of various stakeholders that par icipated in this research show 
that the country has potential in stimulating agricultural activities but their efforts 
could not be effective under harsh macroeconomic conditi ns (see 5.2.8). The 
determination of the political leaders and the kind of policies that they put in place do 
matter. Could the Government of National Unity be th beginning of a new era that 
can revitalise the agricultural sector? This will depend on the kind of policies that it 
adopts and on how seriously it implements them. A populist approach has not been 
sustainable in the past (4.1.2) and neoliberal policies of the 1990s have not lifted the 
smallholder farmer out of the poverty trap either (4.1.3). The Short Term Economic 
Recovery Programme (STERP) of the new Government of National Unity is already 
being criticised for failing to prioritise the finalizing of land tenure security (4.2.4). 
Patrick Bond (The Mercury, [South Africa], 29 September 2008) fears that political 
leaders in the new establishment may forget the concerns of the povo (the masses). 
According to him, the povo may remain trapped in between the interests of the two 
rival political parties (with ZANU [PF] fighting to remain in power and the 
Movement of Democratic Change [MDC] inclining itself to neoliberal policies).  The 
views of stakeholders in this study demonstrated that t ey know what it is necessary 
for them to develop the agricultural sector. However, as Adesina (2007) suggested for 
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farmer organizations in Africa, Zimbabwe farmers’ organisations need to increase the 
political cost for politicians who fail to live up to their promises (see 2.1.4) and force 
the politician’s rhetoric to translate into action. Unfortunately, Zimbabwe may not be 
an exception to John Sender and Sheila Smith’s observation: the working class, which 
carries the potential to turn the political landscape around, is often muffled by post-
Independence regimes under the guise of national unity (see 2.1.4).  
 
Since the problem of agricultural credit in Zimbabwe has symptoms that go beyond 
hyperinflationary causes, it needs a solution that also goes beyond hyperinflation. 
While Government has to restore stability in the national economy and improve the 
regulatory framework and rural infrastructure, much still needs to be done in order to 
develop financial institutions and systems. This will enable these institutions to 
increase their outreach to the poor and in a sustainable way. However, without enough 
political will to formulate and implement most of the policies, agricultural 
development through credit may never come to fruition. 
  




7 Conclusion and Recommendations 
This research has been built on the assumption that agriculture is important for 
development and poverty reduction and that the finance sector can contribute to 
agricultural development through extension of credit to farmers. The deepening 
economic crisis in Zimbabwe, which started in 1997, reached its peak by registering a 
world-record hyperinflation between 2007 and 2008, signalling a collapsed economy. 
Insight from literature showed that agricultural credit does help farmers to increase 
productivity but the supplying institutions also need to be sustainable so that they can 
continue extending credit to the farmers. However, experience from countries that 
experienced hyperinflation indicate that under such circumstances, emphasis shifts 
from lending in general to finding ways of bringing down hyperinflation and 
establishing stabilization, usually through discipline in fiscal and monetary policies.  
The research took a qualitative approach and used a case study methodology to collect 
and analyse views of key informants from stakeholder institutions in agricultural 
sector. The historical features of the country’s agricultural sector was characterised by 
dualism that had a bias for white farm lands and this feature did not disappear after 
independence. The context of Zimbabwe was that of adeclining economy in the 
aftermath of a series of factors, some of which included a highly controversial and 
politicised fast-tracked land reform programme.  
Findings from the field brought forth several issue. They showed that both 
smallholder and large farmers were considered important for increasing agricultural 
productivity in the country and should all have access to credit. Private banks reduced 
their lending to new farmers, mainly due to lack of collateral security. The 
Government remained as the main funder of agricultural activities through 
concessionary loans provided by the RBZ. These loans were part of what fuelled 
hyperinflation and the central bank printed more and more money to cope with the 
hyperinflation. The slow speed at which the loans were released could not catch up 
with the rise of hyperinflation. Government tried to control prices but this only led to 
shortage of inputs. It tried to provide inputs, but again, they usually came late. 
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Corruption and politicization of these inputs interfered in the distribution process. The 
various copying strategies that the stakeholders appro ched in this research were 
ineffective to produce positive results.  
An analysis of these findings indicated that in a hyperinflationary environment such 
as that in Zimbabwe, agricultural credit does not benefit the nation in the long run as 
high prices trigger the printing of more money to fund the sector. Instead, credit only 
leads to development if it is administered in a stable macroeconomic environment. In 
the case of Zimbabwe, a stable macroeconomic environment means eliminating 
hyperinflation and establishing proper rules that favour extending of credit by banks 
and the building of rural infrastructure. The development of financial institutions and 
systems in order to encourage both innovation leading to more outreach to the poor by 
financial institutions and financial sustainability s another challenge that Zimbabwe 
has to face in order to uplift the agricultural sector. These challenges existed before 
hyperinflation. The latter merely brought them into the limelight. This crisis presents 
an opportunity for Zimbabwe to set the record straight once and for all and reclaim its 
position as the bread basket of Southern Africa. Nevertheless, nothing will change 
unless Government, not only formulates proper policies, but also implements them. It 
is at the level of implementation that many governme ts in Sub-Saharan Africa 
usually fail (see 2.1.4). The Government of National Unity, which the civil society 
should, nonetheless, make sure it keeps its promises,  still to pass the test of 
stabilizing the economy.   
This paper offers a few policy and further research recommendations. In order to 
promote access to rural finance Government needs to put priority in establishing 
communal or rural infrastructure. This entails building of roads, dams and provision 
of irrigation facilities. The fundraising, planning and implementing of this programme 
may need creating synergies with various ministries and the private sector involved in 
development and service delivery systems in rural aeas. Since the economy of 
Zimbabwe is agro-based, it is necessary for Governmnt to speedily establish with 
finality, the land tenure provisions so that private commercial banks can be assured of 
security when they issue loans to new farmers. Since Government cannot capitalise 
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Agribank, we recommend it to allow this bank to forge partnership with private 
organizations that value development goals.   
In terms of further research, there is still need to find out how financial institutions 
can optimally increase both their sustainability and outreach to smallholder farmers. A 
repayment rate of 98% to Cottco by smallholder farmers is remarkable. Future 
research can be made in order to closely establish the story behind the achievement by 
Cottco and verify if all parties are winners in theprocess. This case study can serve as 
best practice for other institutions. Another area of research concerns the access to 
foreign currency by smallholder farmers. Given the history of poor financial services 
in the rural areas, future research may also explore the mode and extent to which 
foreign currency has been circulating in the rural areas since the introduction of the 
multicurrency system.  
__________________________________________________    
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Appendix 1: List of Respondents 
Interview 
code 
Date Position Gender Institution Location 
D 12/08 Key Informant M Agribank Harare 
F 02/06/09 Relationship Manager M ZB Bank Rotten Row -
Harare 




H 04/06/09 Inputs Administration 
Officer 
M Tobacco Industry and 
Marketing Board (TIMB) 
Harare 
J 08/06/09 Operations Manager M Grain Marketing Board Harare 
K 10/06/09 Agronomist M Pannar Seed  Ruwa 
L 15/06/09 Sales Manager M SeedCo Stapleford, 
Harare 
M 23/06/09 Marketing Manager M Windmill Westgate, 
Harare 
N 08/06/09 Head of Planning and 
Business Department 









R 03/06/09 Economist M Zimbabwe Farmers’ Union Harare 
S 10/03/09 Key Informant M A2 Farmer Harare 
T 23/06/09 Focus Group  M & F A1 Farmers Macheke 
 
P a g e | 86 
 
 
Appendix 2: Interview guide 
Questions directed to institutions that supply credit 
How can your operations be described with regard to agricultural credit 
under current conditions?  
What do you supply credit facilities for? Where do you get your money from? Is 
it easy to get? Which group of farmers do your finance? How do you select 
them? What do you consider most in selecting them? Is it helpful to extend 
credit to poor farmers given that they may fail to repay you? Why? How do you 
get repayment? What has been your experience with regard to credit recovery? 
Do you make any follow-up on defaulters and what has been your experience in 
doing so? What credit constraints are linked to hyperinflation and what 
constraints are general? What measures have you been taking to overcome the 
challenges associated with hyperinflation? What do you think should be done? 
What do you think you could have done better as a credit supplier? What can 
farmers do better?  
Which group of farmers (smallholder or large farmers) do you think should be 
targeted in terms of extending credit? Why this particular group and not the 
other one? 
Is what you are doing effective, given the current conomic conditions? If yes, 
why? If not, why? 
Questions directed to farmers or organizations that represent them 
How can your activities as farmers in relation to credit acquisition and use 
be described?  
Where do you credit from? Why do you choose that par icular credit supplier 
and not the others? What do you need to get the credit? Is access to credit easy? 
What do you use the credit for? Is it enough for your purposes? How do you 
repay? How has been your repayment practice? What happens if you fail to 
repay? Does the supplier make any follow-up if you fail to repay? What credit 
constraints are linked to hyperinflation and what constraints are general? What 
measures are you taking to overcome these constraint ? What do you think that 
you should have done better as farmers during hyperinflation? What should the 
supplier have done better? 
Which group of farmers (smallholder or large farmers) do you think should be 
targeted in terms of extending credit? Why this particular group and not the 
other one? 
Is what you are doing effective, given the current conomic conditions? If yes, 
why? If not, why? 
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Appendix 3: Key periods in Zimbabwean history 
Sources: Ndlela (1980), Palmer (1977), Nziramasanga (1980), Riddell (1978) (cited in Ndlela and Robinso  2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
